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In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in the voluntary disclosures in the 
audit committee report by different stakeholders such as corporate governance organizations and 
institutional investors. Based on the different requests for enhanced audit committee disclosures, 
the SEC issued a concept release during 2015 proposing several enhancements and requesting 
public comment (Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 2015). 
 In this dissertation, we investigate the voluntary disclosures in the audit committee report. 
The purpose of our study is twofold: 1) to analyze the comment letters to understand "investors' 
needs" in the context of the audit committee disclosures, 2) to investigate the association 
between voluntary disclosures in the audit committee report and earnings management, and the 
voluntary disclosures impact on the external environment. The first essay analyzes the comment 
letters by using a framing analysis. We aim to understand how each respondent category defines 
the current audit committee disclosure requirements in fulfilling "investors' needs." We compare 
and contrast the respondents’ frames and analyze their discourse. The second essay is composed 
of two studies and considers the top US Bank Holding Companies (BHC). We study the 
association between the voluntary disclosures in the audit committee reports and banks' earnings 
quality. Also, in this study, we analyze the impact of the voluntary disclosures in the audit 
committee report on the implied cost of equity and financial analysts' forecasting properties.  
The results reveal that there is a wide variation among respondents in defining “investors’ 
needs” and how they argue to convince the SEC to adopt their point of view. Also, the discourse 
analysis reveals several issues at the corporate governance level that require the SEC attention. 
As for the second essay, the results show that there is a positive association between voluntary 
disclosures and earnings management. In our view, it implies that audit committees are engaged 
in impression management. Also, the results suggest that there is a positive relationship between 
the voluntary disclosures and cost of equity. It implies that the investors are able to know that the 
voluntary disclosures do not reveal strong performance by the audit committees and as a 
consequence, they will require a higher rate of return. Finally, for the financial analysts’ 
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forecasting properties, it seems that they have learned that these voluntary disclosures are 
impression management. They are able to make better forecasting as the results suggest a 
negative relationship between voluntary disclosures and forecasting errors and forecasting 
dispersion. 
Overall, our results have practical implications for the regulator and policy-makers. The 
framing analysis of the comment letters provides evidence about the need to have a common 
understanding of the “investors’ needs” in the audit committee disclosure context. The 
qualitative study is focusing on “investors’ needs” which is a critical concern for the SEC. Also, 
one of the regulator’s goal is to ensure that investors maintain confidence in financial markets. 
Our results show that audit committees engage in impression management. This practice can 
have bad consequences on investors’ confidence and require the SEC intervention.  
 
Keywords: Audit Committee, Voluntary Disclosures, Framing Analysis, Earnings Management, 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This dissertation studies the voluntary disclosures in the audit committee report. Since 
2012, several corporate governance organizations and institutional investors pointed out that 
audit committees are not providing adequate information about the activities they perform during 
the year and call for more faithful reporting. For example, during the March 2013 Tapestry 
Networks’ summit1, one of the main discussed topics was: “regulators, policy-makers, and many 
investors would benefit from a more robust understanding of what the public audit committee 
does and how it oversees the external audit firm and performs its responsibilities”. According to 
Michelle Edkins, managing director and global head of corporate governance and responsible 
investment at BlackRock, the world’s largest asset manager: “The audit committee report is very 
dry – it is not informative” (Tapestry Networks, 2013). Another example is the Council of 
Institutional Investors who requested that: “the audit committee report should provide 
meaningful information to investors about how the committee carries out its responsibilities” 
(Tapestry Networks, 2014). In contrast, the audit committees argue that they have engaged in an 
upward trend in audit committee voluntary disclosure since 2012. Audit committees have 
disclosed information about their financial reporting oversight activities beyond the current 
mandatory requirements set by the SEC (Center for Audit Quality, 2015; Deloitte, 2017; EY 
Center for Board Matters, 2016). Following years of debate, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) issued a concept release proposing several additions to the audit committee 
mandatory disclosures and encouraging further voluntary disclosures. The SEC’s proposal 
ultimately aims to provide investors with more information about financial process oversight and 
additional background for audit committees’ activities. (Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), 2015). 
 There is scant evidence related to the audit committee voluntary disclosures. Hence, in 
order to narrow the gap, the dissertation will be producing evidence that addresses different 
aspects of the audit committee voluntary disclosures. More specifically, we will attempt to 
answer the following research questions: 1) How each stakeholder group perceives the 
                                                 
1 "Tapestry brings leaders together to explore productive, new ways to address critical challenges in corporate 
governance, financial services, and healthcare. The annual audit committee leadership summit brings together 
audit committee chairs from leading North American and European companies for a rich sharing of perspectives on 




“investors’ needs” in the context of the audit committee voluntary disclosures? 2) Do the 
voluntary disclosures in the audit committee report provide incremental information that shows 
strong performance by the audit committees, or it is an impression management practiced by the 
audit committees to hide their weak performance? 3) Do the voluntary disclosures in the audit 
committee report have an effect on the implied cost of equity and the financial analysts’ 
forecasting properties? 
 The dissertation is motivated by the debate between the institutional investors and 
corporate governance organizations who are not satisfied by the current audit committee 
disclosures, and the audit committees who perceive that their disclosures provide useful 
information for the investors. The comment letters that were submitted in response to the SEC 
proposed revisions reveal that there is a big gap in the views among the different stakeholders. 
Our studies provide empirical evidence to several questions that were addressed in the SEC 
concept release. In our studies, two sources are considered. The first one is the comment letters 
that were drafted by the different respondents to the SEC in response to the proposed changes to 
the audit committee disclosures. These letters provide a rich content to understand how 
respondents perceive “investors’ needs” in the context of audit committee disclosures. As for 
testing the second and third research questions, we consider a sample of top bank holding 
companies in the US. 
The banking industry provides a unique setting for analyzing audit committees reporting. 
First, the banking industry plays an important role in the society as it is a major player in the 
financial system and the economy. Strong governance and oversight of banks are needed for the 
whole financial system stability (Adams, 2010). Second, the banking industry is characterized by 
having higher information asymmetry than other industries due to the complexity of banking 
operations (Billingsley & Schneller, 2009). This complexity in the banking business provides 
managers with significant flexibility to manipulate earnings (Kanagaretnam, Krishnan, & Lobo, 
2010). Third, as an outcome of such complexity, banks’ auditing is more difficult than auditing 
other industries (Billingsley & Schneller, 2009). Fourth, the banking industry is highly visible as 
it is heavily followed by investors, and is intensively regulated and monitored by the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Federal Reserve Board. Consequently, any 
restatement of financial position or change in the bank performance can lead to major negative 
impact on the economy, investors, depositors, and the society (Ittonen, Tronnes, & Vähämaa, 
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2016). For all the above reasons, the audit committee function is critical within the banking 
context. The audit committee has an essential role in protecting the investors and the depositors 
by overseeing the financial reporting process and the external auditor. Thus, the audit committee 
report is an important communication tool that provides information about the activities of the 
audit committee during the year. 
In this dissertation, first, we analyze the comment letters by using framing analysis. We 
attempt to understand how each respondent category defines the current audit committee 
disclosure requirements in fulfilling "investors' needs", proposes changes for improving the 
situation, and convinces the SEC to embrace their views. More specifically, we assess the 
respondent frames by comparing and contrasting them, and analyzing the respondents’ discourse. 
Our findings reveal that there is a wide divergence in views. Investors agree with the SEC’s plan 
to increase audit committees transparency. They urge the audit committees to improve the 
disclosures in order to understand the activities undertaken during the year and evaluate the 
oversight performance. By contrast, non-investors respondents – audit committees, management, 
legal advisers and auditors – are generally against the SEC proposed enhancements. They 
perceive that the current audit committee disclosure requirements provide adequate information 
for investors. Disclosing additional disclosure will harm the investors since they may not be able 
to evaluate the information and may become confused. 
In the second part of the dissertation, we take a quantitative approach. We study the 
association between the voluntary disclosures in the audit committee report and earnings quality. 
The empirical results show that audit committees provide more voluntary disclosures whenever 
the earnings management is high. It implies audit committees engage in impression management 
since they disclose more about their oversight activities when managers manipulate the bank's 
earnings. In addition, we consider the effect of the disclosures on the external environment. More 
specifically, we analyze the effect of the voluntary disclosures on the implied cost of equity and 
the financial analysts' forecasting accuracy and forecasting dispersion. As the voluntary 
disclosures are impression management practices by audit committees, the cost of equity will be 
increasing when the audit committees increase the level of voluntary disclosures. However, the 
results suggest that the voluntary disclosures improve the financial analysts' forecasting accuracy 
and decrease forecasting dispersion. 
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Our dissertation contributes to the accounting literature in several ways. The first part, the 
qualitative study, analyzes the comment letters that are a unique set of data. The study is the first 
study that analyzes the different stakeholders understanding towards “investors’ needs” in the 
context of audit committee disclosures. The results of the frame analysis and respondents 
discourse provide empirical results to the regulators and board of directors about the current 
governance issues that require to be addressed in order to increase investors’ confidence in the 
US financial market. 
Second, the quantitative part of the dissertation focuses on the voluntary disclosures in 
the audit committee report in top US bank holding companies. To the best of our knowledge, this 
is the first study that analyzes whether audit committees, sub-committees of the board, engage in 
impression management through additional voluntary disclosure. Prior research analyzes board 
of directors obfuscating excessive pay in compensation disclosure information (Hooghiemstra, 
Kuang, & Qin, 2017; Mangen & Magnan, 2012); however, it did not analyze the board of 
directors engagement in impression management. The empirical results suggest that audit 
committees engage in impression management. This knowledge is paramount for the SEC which 
is working on improving the audit committee disclosures. 
Third, the quantitative part of the dissertation is not only limited to the internal 
environment of the firm, i.e., earning quality, but goes out to the external environment. The study 
extends to analyze the usefulness of the voluntary disclosures in the audit committee report on 
the cost of equity and financial analysts’ forecasting properties. The second and third 
contributions of the dissertation provide a direct answer to the SEC following concern: 
“…there appears to be limited research as to why some companies provide voluntary 
disclosure regarding audit committee activities and whether and how such additional 
information impacts investors’ investment or voting decisions” (Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), 2015) 
Thus, the dissertation investigates why some audit committees disclose more voluntary 
disclosures than others, the impact of the voluntary disclosures on the investors required rate of 
return, and on the financial analysts’ forecasting properties.   
Fourth, the quantitative part of the dissertation targets audit committees of banks which 
have been rarely studied in the accounting literature due to the peculiarity of the banking 
5 
 
industry (Ittonen et al., 2016). As mentioned above, the banking industry provides a unique 
setting for analyzing audit committees reporting; thus this study fills the gap in the literature. 
The remainder of the dissertation is as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the prior literature 
related to audit committees disclosures. Chapter 3 presents the framing analysis tool and the 
frames of the comment letters respondents, and discusses the evidence drawn from the frames 
analysis. Chapter 4 develops hypotheses, presents methodologies, and discusses the results of the 
voluntary disclosures in the audit committee report association with the earnings management. 
Also, it discusses the impact of the voluntary disclosures on the implied cost of equity and 





Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Background on the Audit Committee Report 
Since 1999, and based on the Blue Ribbon Committees' recommendations, the Securities 
& Exchange Commission (SEC) requires all public firms' audit committees to issue an audit 
committee report on an annual basis. The SEC aimed to enhance disclosures related to the 
governance and performance of audit committees and to improve financial statements’ 
reliability. It then argued that audit committees disclosing their work with external auditors and 
management would assist investors to understand the activities undertaken by audit committees 
which would allow them to assess audit committees effectiveness and increase their confidence 
in the financial reporting (Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 1999). 
Audit committees are accountable to external stakeholders, including investors, via their 
report to the board of directors which is typically provided in the annual proxy statement. In the 
report, audit committee members provide the findings and recommendations concerning the 
effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting, and the effectiveness of external and 
internal audit functions. The report is not a standardized report such as the auditor report. It 
should explain the activities undertaken by the audit committee during its meetings, describe the 
reviews conducted, and deliver its findings and recommendations to the board of directors 
(Braiotta Jr, Gazzaway, Colson, & Ramamoorti, 2010). The current disclosure requirements 
stipulate that the audit committee should state whether it performed the following activities: 1) 
reviewed and discussed financial reporting with management, 2) discussed with independent 
auditors about independence matters, 3) received disclosures from the independent auditor 
regarding its independence, 4) recommended to the board of directors that the audited financial 
statements be included in the annual report. Also, the audit committee has to disclose whether 
the board of directors approved a written charter for the audit committee, and whether the audit 
committee members are independent as per applicable standards. Audit committees of public 
companies have to comply with these requirements since January 2000 (Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), 1999).  
 Concerns have been raised by several stakeholders that disclosures under these 
requirements do not meet investors’ needs as they do not provide them with sufficiently useful 
information. For instance, it is often noted that audit committee disclosure requirements have not 
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changed since 1999 (Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 2015). In contrast, in other 
aspects of corporate governance and financial reporting, several rules have appeared since then 
requiring different corporate disclosures, the most well-known being the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002. Therefore, it is argued that the situation needs to be fixed as investors and other 
stakeholders are demanding greater transparency and better communication (Tammy 
Whitehouse, 2015). Also, investors have been looking for more information on the processes the 
audit committees undertake in fulfilling their responsibilities. Investors want not only to know 
about the audit committees’ responsibilities but how they are fulfilled (Steinberg, 2014). 
In recent years, there has been increasing attention devoted to audit committee 
disclosures. In 2012, a partnership, Audit Committee Collaboration, was formed by US corporate 
governance organizations2. One of the outcomes of this partnership is a study called “Call to 
Action: Enhancing the audit committee report.” In this study, the partnership urges companies of 
different sizes and industries to increase their audit committee disclosures to “more effectively 
convey to investors and others the critical aspects of the important work that they currently 
perform.” Also, this partnership mentions that investors are interested in audit committees whose 
activities would enhance audit quality. For this reason, the audit committee disclosures would 
increase investors and regulators confidence in the financial markets (Audit Committee 
Collaboration, 2012).             
In addition to the Audit Committee Collaboration, EY has been tracking voluntary audit 
committee disclosures since 2012 for the top 100 US companies. It notices that the trend of 
disclosing voluntary information about audit committees has been increasing since 2012 (EY 
Center for Board Matters, 2016). Similarly, Deloitte analyzes trends in audit committee reporting 
for S&P 100 companies and confirms the increasing trend of voluntary disclosure (Deloitte, 
2017). Furthermore, the Center for audit quality (CAQ) and Audit analytics have conducted 
several studies called “Audit Committee Transparency Barometer.” The last one issued in 
November 2017 analyzes the trend of voluntary disclosures for S&P 500, S&P MidCap, and 
S&P SmallCap for the years 2014, 2015, and 2016. They find an increasing trend of voluntary 
                                                 
2 “The Audit Committee Collaboration is a partnership of nationally recognized U.S. corporate governance and 
policy organizations. The organizations came together in 2012 to collaborate on projects intended to leverage their 
individual efforts to expand audit committee member access to useful tools and material across the spectrum of 
public companies in order to strengthen audit committee performance and transparency.” Source: 
http://auditcommitteecollaboration.org/about.html   
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disclosures that is remarkable for S&P 500, and smaller for S&P MidCap and S&P SmallCap 
(Center for Audit Quality, 2017).  
Based on the investors’ call for enhanced corporate governance, there is much pressure to 
increase audit committee voluntary disclosures. Hence, on July 1, 2015, the SEC issued a 
concept release in which it proposes possible revisions to the audit committee disclosures to 
increase mandatory disclosure requirements. The SEC aims to get an understanding from the 
different stakeholders whether a change in the current requirements of the audit committee 
disclosures is needed or not. Also, the SEC is interested to know whether additional disclosures 
would assist investors in improving their investment decisions and voting decisions. The concept 
release focuses on three areas to enhance the audit committee disclosures: 1) audit committee's 
oversight of the auditor, 2) audit committee's process for appointing or retaining the auditor, and 
3) qualifications of the audit firm and certain members of the engagement team that the audit 
committee oversees. In addition to these three areas, the concept release has a fourth area that is 
titled additional request for comment regarding audit committee disclosures; it covers diverse 
topics. Overall, the concept release includes 74 questions related to audit committee disclosures. 
The public was invited to comment on the proposed changes during 60 days (Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), 2015). As of today, the SEC has not mandated any of the audit 
committee requirements. 
2.2 Prior Literature on the Audit Committee Report 
 In general, few studies analyze the audit committee report. During the early 1990s, the 
Treadway Commission highly recommended that audit committees chairmen issue an audit 
committee report. At that time, the SEC was not convinced of the usefulness of this report. 
Urbancic (1991) takes an experimental approach in investigating the usefulness of audit 
committee reports. His results suggest that participants do not perceive significant useful 
information in the audit committee report. The results confirm the SEC’s approach at that time in 
not requiring listed firms to issue an audit committee report on an annual basis. In addition, 
Turpin and DeZoort (1998) analyze the characteristics of firms that issue an audit committee 
report on a voluntary basis as it was not mandatory before January 2000. They also survey firms 
that issue an audit committee report to collect information about their incentives to issue the 
report. Their results suggest that mainly larger firms include an audit committee report on a 
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voluntary basis. The survey results reveal that management decides whether or not to incorporate 
an audit committee report in the annual report.   
Some papers investigate audit committee reports following the SEC regulation enacted in 
2000. Rezaee, Olibe, & Minmier (2003) study the audit committee reports’ content for Fortune 
100 US companies. They find that all the companies comply with the SEC mandatory disclosure 
requirements. Also, they show that the reports focus more on the audit committee’s roles and 
composition rather than the processes of fulfilling financial reporting oversight. Moreover, 
Pandit, Subrahmanyam, & Conway (2006) examine the voluntary disclosures in audit committee 
reports of one hundred companies listed on NYSE in 2004. Their research assesses whether such 
reports contain voluntary disclosures that show compliance with SEC and NYSE requirements. 
Results suggest that there is a wide variance in the audit committee reports content. Few 
companies provided voluntary disclosures, while the majority of firms provided just the 
minimum required disclosures. Finally, Pandit, Subrahmanyam, & Conway (2005) analyze the 
voluntary disclosures in the audit committee report of one hundred companies listed on NYSE 
before (2003) and after (2004), the implementation of SOX. The content analysis of the reports 
shows that the voluntary disclosures in the audit committee reports increased significantly in 
three areas: designated audit committee member as a financial expert, auditor independence, and 
pre-approval policy of non-audit services.      
With the recent regulatory changes of the auditor report and audit committee report in the 
UK in 2013 and the proposed changes in the US, several studies have been conducted. Reid, 
Carcello, Li, & Neal (2016) investigate the impact of the UK regulatory changes. They find that 
the new reporting regime improves audit quality in addition to investors’ reaction to 
announcements of unexpected earnings. Also, the study shows that the new reporting regime 
does not increase audit fees significantly and that audits are not delayed due to these changes. 
Overall, they find that the new auditor reporting and audit committee reporting significantly 
improve audit quality without a significant increase in audit fees. As for the studies related to the 
audit committees disclosures of US firms, two studies have been conducted after the SEC 
proposed the disclosures enhancements. Draeger, Lawson, & Schmidt (2018) analyze the audit 
committee report by conducting a large-scale textual analysis. They find that larger firms 
disclose more voluntary disclosures than small firms. They do not find an association between 
voluntary disclosures in the audit committee reports and restatements or material weaknesses in 
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internal controls. As for Ye (2018), the author investigates the usefulness of the disclosures in 
the audit committee report. His results suggest that there is a negative relationship between the 
voluntary disclosures level and votes withheld from incumbent audit committee members. 
Overall, he finds that the current audit committee voluntary disclosures are useful for the 
shareholders’ decision making in electing auditing committee members and ratifying auditors. 
2.3 Overview of Other Board of Directors’ Reporting 
 In general, the board of directors reports to the shareholders are not numerous. Besides 
the audit committee reporting, the executive compensation committee, sub-committee of the 
board, reports to the shareholders about the executive compensation practices (Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), 1992). On October 15, 1992, the SEC issued a new regulation 
requiring the boards to issue a report that discloses the executive compensation. The SEC 
requirement addresses the issue that shareholders lack information about executive 
compensation. The additional reporting improves their ability to ensure that the directors are 
acting in the best interests of shareholders. 
 The executive compensation report describes how the management performance is 
assessed and how their payment is aligned with the performance. The directors have to describe 
the set of actions undertaken in order to reach the executive compensation package. Also, the 
report explains to the shareholders how the CEO compensation is performance-related and the 
measures considered in setting the compensation level (Laksmana, 2008). The SEC rule does not 
specify the report format or the content details; it provides general guidance that needs to be 
followed by the board in drafting the report (Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 1992). 
 Several studies analyze the voluntary disclosures in the executive compensation report. 
Laksmana (2008) studies the determinants of voluntary disclosures in the executive 
compensation report. He finds that there is a positive association between the compensation 
committee voluntary disclosures and the firm size and the meeting frequency of the 
compensation committee. Chung, Judge, & Li (2015) analyze the effect of voluntary disclosures 
on pay-for-performance. They find that voluntary disclosures enhance the monitoring abilities of 
the board. Moreover, several studies have considered the clarity of executive compensation 
report. Hooghiemstra, Kuang, & Qin (2017) suggest that UK boards of directors practice 
obfuscation of information in case of CEO excessive pay by decreasing the readability of the 
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compensation report. Also, Mangen and Magnan (2012) examine the debate surrounding the 
adoption of “Say on Pay” and suggest that boards of directors that have an incentive to maintain 
inefficient pay plans can manipulate compensation disclosure reports. Board of directors can 
ensure that compensation disclosures be perceived in line with shareholders’ interest. 
 Overall, the board of directors reporting to the shareholders is minimal. Mainly, the board 
issue the audit committee report and the executive compensation report. Our study focuses on the 




Chapter 3: Framing “Investors’ Needs” in the Context of Audit Committee 
Disclosures: Evidence from the Comment Letters 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we analyze how the comment letters’ respondents to the SEC concept 
release interpret "investors' needs" in the context of audit committee disclosures. The aim is to 
provide insight as to how each respondent group attempts to define “investors’ needs,” and on 
the motivation underlying the proposed changes to audit committee disclosures they ultimately 
address at the SEC. The comment letters, total of 102 letters submitted to the SEC, are drafted by 
a cross-section of governance actors, with different roles with respect to audit committee 
disclosures: preparers (audit committees), users (investors), agents whose actions are judged and 
reported (external auditors, management, legal) or researchers (academics).  
Even though growing attention has been given to the audit committee disclosures since 
2012, the notion of "investors' needs" in the context of these disclosures is not similarly 
understood by investors and non-investors. It is clear from prior meetings among the different 
stakeholders that they have different views (Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 2015). 
On the one hand, investors have been very vocal in demanding more information and higher 
transparency from audit committees. Several institutional investors such as the United 
Brotherhood of Carpenters Pension Funds or governance organisations such as the Council of 
Institutional Investors are requesting enhanced disclosures (Deloitte, 2015). On the other hand, 
several participants in roundtables that discussed the audit committee enhancements did not 
perceive a need for the change and were concerned about "disclosures overload" that can affect 
the investors negatively. They were not sure whether investors are interested in additional 
disclosures and were concerned that enhancements could lead to "one-size-fits-all" approach that 
does not add value to the investors (Center for Audit Quality, 2013).  
 To analyze the comment letters and how the different respondents understand “investors’ 
needs,” we utilize the concept of frames that was studied initially in the social movement 
research. Goffman (1959) discusses frames as a tool used in the daily life to rationalize 
interactions, rituals, discourses, and other diverse social dealings. Accordingly, any ordinary 
activity can be analyzed by frames. Frames are constructed in a way to converse about current 
issues that require a change, point out to the individual or something to hold responsible, propose 
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a solution, and convince others to support your point of view and embrace your views (Benford 
& Snow, 2000; Snow & Benford, 1988). We document the different respondent categories’ 
frames using the framing tool as an analytical tool. It assists us in addressing our research 
questions: how each respondent category defines current requirements in fulfilling "investors' 
needs", proposes changes for improving the situation, and convinces the SEC to embrace their 
views. More specifically, we assess if the framing tasks are similar or different between the 
respondents’ categories. 
 This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, several researchers have 
called for additional qualitative research on corporate governance as such an approach provides a 
deeper understanding of its underlying processes and the association between audit committee 
inputs and outcomes (McNulty, Zattoni, & Douglas, 2013; Turley & Zaman, 2004; Turley & 
Zaman, 2007). Archival studies are not sufficient to assess audit committees’ performance and 
recognize whether their oversight is fulfilled diligently (Niamh M. Brennan & Kirwan, 2015). 
Our research approach is qualitative and relies on a unique data set, the comment letters 
submitted to the SEC by investors and a cross-section of governance actors, to understand 
"investors' needs" in the context of audit committee disclosures. Engaging in a granular analysis 
of comment letters, the study sheds some light on the nature of the interactions between 
governance actors who are trying to shape the new disclosure requirements. This information 
potentially reveals the impact of governance actors on firms’ internal governance, an aspect 
which has not been studied extensively in previous research.       
 Second, as per our knowledge, this study is the first one that analyzes stakeholders’ 
understanding towards “investors’ needs” in the context of audit committee disclosures. The 
different frames of the respondents provide us with new knowledge. For example, investors’ 
concerns related to audit committees power, and independence in appearance but not in fact are 
major issues that require deep understanding to resolve it.   
 Third, this research has significant practical implications for the regulators and board of 
directors. The study provides evidence that there is not a common understanding about 
"investors' needs" in the context of audit committee disclosures among investors and other 
governance actors. This is very important for the SEC and board of directors whose aim is to 
promote investors’ confidence in the financial reporting process (Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), 2015). In this context, a recent study suggests that audit committee 
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disclosures are not useful for investors and require improvement (Draeger et al., 2018). 
Furthermore, another study reveals that the new enhanced auditor report and audit committee 
report in the UK context have broad benefits for investors (Reid et al., 2016). Today three years 
after the concept release issuance, it seems that the SEC is not planning to modify the audit 
committee disclosures requirements (DeHaas, Debroah, Phillips, Henry, Hitchcock, & Deloitte 
LLP, 2017; Protiviti, 2017). This study corroborates evidence with other studies that there is a 
need for enhancing the audit committee disclosures. A starting point can be to properly define 
the "investors' needs" in the audit committee disclosures context among the different 
stakeholders. 
3.2 Conceptual Underpinning: Framing Theory 
  The concept of the frame analysis has been employed in social sciences such as 
psychology, linguistics, discourse analysis, communication, and political science and policy 
studies (Benford & Snow, 2000). The concept of frames was studied initially in the social 
movement research. Goffman (1959) discusses frames as a tool used in the daily life to rational 
interactions, rituals, discourses, and other diverse social dealings. Accordingly, any ordinary 
activity can be analyzed by frames. The frame sets the boundaries and lets the observers focus on 
specific events or texts, while limiting their views on other things that exist in our complex 
environment (Creed, Langstraat, & Scully, 2002).   
 In the social movement, actors are seen as representatives who work hard on creating and 
maintaining meaning for allies, opponents, and observers (Snow & Benford, 1988). The social 
movement perceives the concept of constructing when using the word "framing" as it entails 
arguments at the level of constructing reality (Benford & Snow, 2000; Gamson & Lasch, 1981; 
Snow & Benford, 1988). Framing gives meaning to the events by arranging experiences and 
planning for the next steps. It simplifies the complex outside world to activate supporters and 
observers, and demobilize opponents (Snow & Benford, 1988). In other words, framing is a way 
to describe and engage the different arguments and counter-arguments in a complex social 
setting (Gamson & Lasch, 1981).  
 Frames are constructed in a way to converse about current issues that require a change, 
point out to the individual or something to hold responsible, propose a solution, and mobilize 
others to support your point of view and embrace your beliefs. Accordingly, activists, intending 
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to stimulate observers, undergo framing activities that are decomposed into three parts: 
diagnosis, prognosis, and motivation (Benford & Snow, 2000; Snow & Benford, 1988). All these 
tasks are carried out to advance own views and impose own frame on a specific target audience 
(Brivot, Himick, & Martinez, 2017).   
 The diagnosis part deals mainly in defining a "problem." Its role is to identify the 
problematic situation and pinpoint to the sources of the issue. In this chapter, we employ the 
diagnosis part to discuss whether the current audit committee disclosures meet "investors' 
needs." The different respondents describe their understanding of the current situation and if it 
serves the "investors' needs." The respondents who perceive a problem will describe the 
problematic situation and identify the sources causing it. For the respondent who may not 
perceive a problem in the current audit committee disclosure requirements, their description of 
the current situation will be interpreted in light of the "investors' needs." 
 The prognosis part, second framing task, entails proposing a solution to the identified 
problem and a plan on how to tackle it. In this case, the respondents will be arguing about what 
needs to be done to ensure that the "investors' needs" are met in the audit committee disclosures. 
Besides proposing a solution in the prognosis part, the arguments raised can aim to refute the 
solutions advanced by the opponents. This is called "counter-framing" whose goal is to attack the 
arguments of the opponents (Benford, 1987). It causes the opponents to be on the defensive side 
and pushes them to propose better and clearer prognosis. 
 Finally, the motivation part, last framing task, deals in convincing the others to adopt 
their own frame instead of the opponents’ ones. It provides rational and constructs adequate 
vocabulary to motivate the observers to embrace their frame. In our case, the respondents bring 
arguments to the SEC and the readers to follow them in their views. 
 Frames require "activists" such as experts and experienced actors who mobilize others to 
perceive things the way they see it (Kaplan, 2008). As we aim to understand how the different 
respondents perceive the current audit committee disclosures are fulfilling "investors' needs," 
propose solutions, and attempt to motivate the SEC to embrace their views, we use the framing 
theory to assist us in our task. Thus, we implement the framing theory as a tool to structure the 
respondents' arguments and proposed solutions for the current situation. It enables us to approach 
the respondents' comment letters by understanding how the different ideas are linked together to 
form a meaning that is intended to advocate and mobilize the SEC. As an analytical tool, the 
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frame analysis allows us to sort the different point of views and positions related to the 
"investors' needs" in the context of audit committee disclosures.    
3.3 Methodology 
3.3.1 Research Approach 
 Qualitative research is a very suitable method for studies that investigate a topic using a 
theoretical perspective that is different from the quantitative methods that are mostly used 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). For instance, what constitutes “Investors’ needs” has been mostly analyzed 
using agency theory. In this chapter, we analyze the concept of “investors’ needs” in the context 
of audit committee disclosures using framing theory. Framing theory is used as a tool to analyze 
the discourse of the respondents. The frames of the investors, academia, and corporate 
governance actors are analyzed to understand how each respondent category perceives 
"investors' needs" in the context of the audit committee disclosures. Focusing on the comment 
letters of the respondents gives us the opportunity to understand better how each group perceives 
"investors' needs" fulfilled with the current requirements and what needs to be done to improve 
the current situation. 
3.3.2 Data 
 We downloaded the comment letters from the SEC website. Overall, 102 letters were 
received, out of which seven were requests for expanding the 60 days period as it was falling 
within the summer break of employees. Also, there were four letters that were disregarded from 
the analysis as their content was not specifically related to the concept release. So the overall 
number of letters that are analyzed is 91. Major US companies, audit firms, legal firms, 
institutional investors, and associations drafted the comment letters. Some of the respondents 
represent foreign investors or companies.   
 We classify the comment letters according to the signatory’s title (i.e., Audit Committee 
Chairman, or Chief Financial Officer). We categorize the respondents as follows: Academia, 
Association (professional or regulatory bodies), Audit committee, External auditor, Investor, 
Legal, Management (an executive position). Table 1 shows the total number of letters analyzed 
in this chapter together with the respondent's categories. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
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 We develop frames for each of the respondents’ categories except for association 
respondents as such letters are drafted by different types of associations that represent views and 
positions that are not homogenous. However, while associations are not grouped within a frame, 
their views and comments were considered in the analysis and discussion. In contrast, the views 
of management and legal respondents were extremely similar; thus one frame was developed to 
represent their positions. Hence, we develop five frames for the following categories of 
respondents: investors, academia, management and legal, audit committees, and external 
auditors. 
 In addition to the comment letters submitted to the SEC, our analysis also relies on the 
concept release which initiated the request for the comments. The concept release is a significant 
data source since it provides the regulator’s objectives together with seventy-four questions that 
are proposed as enhancements for the current disclosure requirements. Similarly, we refer to the 
first call in 2012 that was initiated by the audit committee collaboration partnership. 
Understanding their call to action is essential for understanding the perceptions and needs of the 
investors and corporate governance practitioners. 
3.3.3 Data Analysis 
 Data analysis implies iterative reading and coding of the comment letters. In the first 
round, the comment letters are read to obtain a broad view of the different respondents' views. In 
the second round, the comment letters are read and coded in an inductive approach which allows 
themes to emerge out from the data. After the coding is done, the themes are grouped to 
differentiate between main and emerging themes versus those that are secondary in importance 
based on their occurrence frequency. Differentiating themes based on their occurrence frequency 
improves the robustness of qualitative research (Melanie Roussy & Brivot, 2016).   
 In the third round, the themes and trends are coded according to their relation to apparent 
framing activities. As the respondents are attempting to convince the SEC of their point of view 
by constructing their frames, we consider the framing tasks and separate the themes into the three 
different frame components: diagnosis, prognosis, and motivation. For the diagnosis part, we 
identify themes that raise the issue as to whether the current audit committee disclosures meet 
"investors' needs" or not. For the prognosis part, we look for themes that identify solutions for 
the articulated problem in the diagnosis part. In this particular case, the prognosis illustrates what 
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needs to be done to ensure that "investors' needs" are met in the context of audit committee 
disclosures. As for the motivation part, we look for arguments brought by respondents to 
convince the SEC about the merits of their position. Altogether, the three parts, diagnosis, 
prognosis, and motivation, form a frame. The outcome of the third round is the formation of the 
five frames. These five frames together with the SEC concept release constitute the data we use 
for our empirical analysis. 
 In our empirical analysis, we compare and contrast the different frames of the 
respondents to analyze how they perceive “investors’ needs” and how they attempt to convince 
the SEC to consider their point of view. Also, we conduct a discourse analysis to study the 
respondents use of words in presenting their views. 
 
3.4 Findings 
Our analysis reveals that the notion of “investors’ needs” in the context of audit 
committee disclosures differs according to a respondent’s category. Each respondent category 
frames "investors' needs" differently and, relying on these frames, argues as to whether a change 
is needed or not. Table 2 summarizes the different frames that will be presented in this section. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
3.4.1 Investors’ Frame: Lack of Transparency…Change is in Great Need to Protect Us 
3.4.1.1 Diagnosis  
The investors’ discussion in the comment letters reveals that a high information 
asymmetry exists between investors and the audit committees. Audit committees have a 
fiduciary duty to protect investors’ interests; however, the investors do not know what the audit 
committees are doing during the year to fulfill their role in protecting them. The agency cost 
arising from the uncertainty faced by investors with respect to how audit committees acquit 
themselves of their monitoring obligations toward investors does not seem to be mitigated by the 
current audit committee disclosures. 
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 Investors raise the following arguments to describe the lack of transparency by audit 
committees that does not allow them to fulfill their role as the company owners. First, they note 
that the current audit committee disclosure requirements have not changed since 1999 even 
though significant changes took place that affected the role and responsibilities of the audit 
committees: the advent of Sarbanes-Oxley, other regulatory and standard changes, evolution in 
industry, governance or business best practices. 
Second, while describing the current lack of transparency, several investors’ respondents 
mention the fact that the current audit committee report requirements are minimalist and do not 
provide information about the audit committee oversight role. For instance, the California State 
Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS)3 points to the fact that audit committees do not disclose 
the process of selecting and reappointing the external auditor, a decision which is important for 
investors who have concerns about some auditors’ long tenure: 
“The audit committees are not required to provide information regarding its process or 
reasons for the selection of a particular independent auditor. CalSTRS has concerns with 
companies having long-tenured auditors, so it is important for us to understand the audit 
committee’s justifications or rationale for selecting or retaining the current auditor.” 
Also, investors compare between the audit committee disclosures and the disclosures provided 
by the compensation committee. They find a significant discrepancy between the two; the 
compensation committee disclosures are more elaborate, thus helping investors improve 
practices within the firm as they have more information related to say-on-pay disclosures. The 
limited available information about the audit committee prevents investors from rectifying some 
practices that are potentially not in the best interests of the firm. 
Besides being relatively scant, investors point out that the information they receive is not 
useful to them to act upon. Calling it boilerplate language, the California Public Employees’ 
Retirement System (CalPERS)4 is not satisfied with the current situation as it does not receive 
useful information that meets its needs as an institutional investor: 
“The standard US company audit committee report is a boilerplate document that fails to 
provide specific company and industry information. It refers the investors to a charter and 
                                                 
3 Public pension fund with funds around $191 billion for 880,000 plan participants 
4 An institutional investor managing around $301 billion in global assets 
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mentions that the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) Auditing 
Standard No. 16 has been followed.” 
According to CalPERS, the current situation is making investors vulnerable as the information 
they are receiving does not reveal whether the audit committee is fulfilling its role in protecting 
investors’ interest: 
“Currently an audit committee can easily meet the minimum regulatory requirement 
without revealing substantive gaps in oversight.” 
The lack of information is hindering investors’ capability to vote appropriately for 
essential matters such as external auditor ratification or board elections. Hermes Investment 
Management5 discusses the impact of the opaque environment on its voting decisions. The 
institutional investor is voting positively on essential matters even though it lacks information as 
it wants to support the board in its responsibilities: 
“It is false to conclude from the voting patterns that investors are content with the current 
situation: instead typically investors seek to support the board and do not normally have 
enough information to justify not doing so.”  
 Finally, investors compare the current audit committee disclosures in the US to those of 
other parts of the world such as the UK and Europe and point out that the U.S. lags behind in this 
regard. 
 Overall, investors diagnose the current audit committee disclosures as a problem as they 
are provided with little information. Moreover, such information is not useful for their decision-
making. They feel that they are in the dark and vulnerable, not knowing how audit committees 
are accomplishing their oversight duties and protecting their interest. With the current lack of 
transparency that investors face due to meaningless audit committee disclosures, we discuss in 
the next paragraphs how investors’ respondents react to the proposed enhanced disclosures in the 
concept release.  
3.4.1.2 Prognosis    
Investors support all the changes proposed by the SEC as they see in them the means to 
improve their current situation. Their prognosis includes having disclosures mainly related to the 
oversight of the external auditor since most of the questions in the concept release are related to 
                                                 
5 One of the largest asset managers in London with a portfolio of over $200 billion 
21 
 
this issue. They want to remedy the situation by having additional disclosures such as: processes 
in overseeing the external auditor, processes in selecting and reappointing the auditor, processes 
for negotiating audit fees, processes for evaluating the external auditors with long tenure, the 
name of the engagement audit partner, the number of meetings with the auditor, other activities 
related to the financial reporting process oversight.  
 Investor respondents do not object to any of the enhancements proposed by the SEC. 
They promote the need for all disclosures that will rectify the lack of transparency situation they 
face. Essentially, they are inviting the SEC to increase the number of mandatory disclosure 
requirements and, at the same time, encourage audit committees to disclose additional 
information on a voluntary basis. Investor respondents referred to other countries such as the UK 
which has improved their audit committee disclosures to meet investors needs. They underline 
the need for change that has been undertaken in other countries. For example, Hermes 
Investment Management states: 
 "The International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (the “IAASB”) has also 
 acknowledged the merits of enhanced disclosure around the activities of the audit 
 committee." 
Also, several investors’ respondents provide the example of the Rolls Royce audit committee 
report which is in accordance with the UK Financial Reporting Council (FRC). They perceive it 
as a model for the US. In this regard, CalPERS states: 
“The United Kingdom’s (UK) audit committee disclosure requirements provide a great 
example of disclosure requirements that lead to much better reporting. One need only 
read the Rolls Royce Audit Committee Report and compare it to the audit committee 
report of a US company to determine that US audit committees should provide better 
communications to investors.” 
They show the enhancements are possible to be undertaken, and already have been executed. 
Thus, these additional disclosures are feasible. 
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3.4.1.2 Motivation  
Investors’ respondents bring forward different arguments to justify their request for 
disclosures enhancements. Several respondents point to some prior cases that left the investors 
with significant losses. For example, Kermit Kubitz6 states: 
 "Such enhanced audit committee interaction and identification of issues might prevent or 
 have prevented problems such as Enron's mark to market recognition of future 
sales, or Banking industry creation of off-book special purpose entities SPE's who's later 
recognition on parent books contributed to the financial crisis of 2008." 
Investors are vulnerable to major scandals or crises as they do not know what the audit 
committees actually did during that period to protect their interestsThe suggested additional 
disclosures will enable investors to tell whether the audit committees are conducting their 
oversight properly and allow investors to interfere with corrective actions if needed. 
 Second, investors argue that getting information about the external auditor re-
appointment process is critical as they need to know the audit committee involvement and the 
factors considered in reaching a final decision. Such information is very critical in cases of audit 
firms with long tenure, as emphasized by the Council for Institutional Investors7:  
 "… disclosure about renewing the engagement of an audit firm can help build investor 
confidence by underscoring the thoroughness of the process that led to the audit 
committee’s decision. We believe the benefits of such disclosure are heightened in the 
 case of long auditor tenure." 
  Third, as investors perceive themselves as vulnerable, the additional disclosures will 
provide them with some protection. For example, Norges Bank8 describes the proposed 
disclosures as: 
“… key to the audit committee's evaluation of the external auditor, enhance investor 
protection, and provide useful information to investors.” 
Essentially, investors are keen on having the enhanced disclosures as a means of protection. 
                                                 
6 An independent investor 
7 Non-profit, non-partisan, association of pension funds with combined assets that exceeds $3 
trillion 




 Fourth, investors are calling for additional disclosure since they believe it will increase 
accountability and transparency levels. Audit committees, external audit firms, and engagement 
audit partners will accomplish their duties at a higher professional level since investors and the 
public will know about the different activities that took place during a year.  
 Fifth, investors are eager for additional disclosure as it will raise their confidence in 
financial markets. Several investors recalled the prior cases of Enron, WorldCom, and the recent 
banking financial crisis, all of which caused huge losses for investors. This shows that their 
confidence level in financial markets is relatively low. The proposed disclosures will improve 
their confidence as described by James Edwards, an independent individual investor: 
“… enhancement that would result in an additional degree of investor confidence in the 
process of oversight of financial reporting for all audit committees.”    
 Sixth, several investors stress that financial markets become integrated at the global level. 
In general, investors are investing in different markets; thus, it is vital for US firms to follow 
international trends as it will benefit investors in their decision-making. Institutional investors 
who invest globally emphasize the importance of audit committee disclosures alignment with the 
worldwide pattern. As described by Norges Bank Investment management: 
“We believe international alignment of audit and audit committee reporting would benefit 
investors in an environment where markets, companies, and investors have become 
increasingly global.” 
Finally, as the proposed disclosures will be increasing transparency and raising the 
confidence level of investors, they will be able to make better decisions in voting for the external 
auditor or board members. The institutional investor, American Federation of Labor and 
Congress of Industrial Organizations, considers that the improved voting practices by the 
investors will improve corporate governance accountability mechanisms.  
As a summary, investors present the proposed disclosures as the solution for their current 
situation. They support the SEC’s position by describing how these proposed additional 
disclosures will make them less vulnerable since they will know whether audit committees are 
performing their duties correctly or not, improve accountability and transparency, increase their 
confidence in financial markets, and allow them to vote appropriately at shareholders’ meetings. 





3.4.2 Academia Respondents’ Frame: Woefully Inadequate with no Value for Investors…Update 
Disclosures to Become a Signaling Device 
3.4.2.1 Diagnosis 
 The academic respondents diagnose the current audit committee disclosures as failing to 
communicate satisfactorily, thus causing investors to be in the dark about underlying processes 
and actions. The disclosures provide minimal information that does not meet investors’ needs, as 
described by Professor Joseph Carcello9: 
 "In my view, existing audit committee disclosures are generally woefully inadequate, and 
 mandated disclosures are so minimal as to provide virtually no useful information." 
Besides the minimal aspect of the disclosure requirements, the respondents believe that what is 
being disclosed is not readable, thus further contributing to investors’ uncertainty. The 
disclosures are drafted in a way that reference to standards that are not clear to a regular investor. 
For example, Professor Dennis Beresford questions the following: 
 "Do investors really understand or derive any value from: We discussed with the 
auditors all communications required by the PCAOB, including AS 16?" 
Referring to specific standards does not convey to investors how the audit committee performed 
during the year to protect the interest of the shareholders. 
Academic respondents also blame the legalistic approach that characterizes audit 
committee disclosures. The audit committees are so concerned about being sued that they draft 
the report in a legalistic way to minimize their legal exposure. This rationale is also contributing 
to obscuring the information environment for investors.   
 Finally, academic respondents argue that the current disclosures do not allow investors to 
differentiate between the audit committees that are good performers from those that are engaging 
in impression management. Even though some audit committees are providing voluntary 
information, investors are still not able to get appropriate information about the audit committees 
performance in protecting investors’ interests. Matthew Reidenbach10, whose thesis is related to 
                                                 
9 Emeritus Professor at Haslam College of Business - University of Tennessee 
10 Assistant professor of accounting at Pace University 
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audit committee disclosures, did not notice a significant change in voluntary disclosures after 
Sarbanes-Oxley and describes the disclosures as: 
“Unfortunately, it is almost impossible for individuals outside the company to disentangle 
whether voluntary disclosure is truly a signal of the chosen effort level or is merely cheap 
talk.”    
   Overall, academic respondents and investors respondents share similar views. The current 
audit committee disclosures do not meet the needs of the investors who are left in the dark. Even 
the voluntary disclosures do not help the investors in assessing whether their interests are 
protected or not as they cannot differentiate between the good performers or mediocre 
performers. 
3.4.2.2 Prognosis 
 To meet investors’ needs in the context of audit committee disclosures, academic 
respondents advise updating the current disclosure requirements. They argue that since the 
requirements did not change since 1999, any update and enhancement will better inform 
investors and go a long way in meeting their needs. Second, the respondents urge audit 
committees to focus on investors’ needs in their disclosures. Accordingly, the disclosure 
approach should change from "what" committees did to "how" audit committees discharge their 
responsibilities. Joseph Carcello explains that investors will receive a more informative 
disclosure when the disclosures approach changes from the “what” to “how” audit committees 
discharge their responsibilities: 
“…the value of the disclosure is not what the audit committee does but rather how the 
audit committee does it."   
Investors will be in a better position to evaluate the audit committee performance with such an 
approach as will have higher information quality about the activities conducted during the year to 
oversee the financial reporting process. 
3.4.2.3 Motivation 
 Academic respondents raise several arguments to induce the SEC further to change 
current requirements. For instance, updating the current audit committee disclosure requirements 
will solve the investors’ problem of being in the dark without relevant information. The 
enhanced disclosures will reduce the information asymmetry as the investors will have 
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significantly more information about the audit committee oversight activities that are intended to 
safeguard their interest. A comment letter drafted by several professors representing the 
American Accounting Association (AAA) highlights the advantage of disclosure enhancements: 
“We also believe that as long as disclosures are specific and readable, they would result 
in reduced information asymmetry between investors and the firm because we know from 
prior research that AC affect audit quality, and audit quality, in turn, affects the cost of 
equity and debt capital."    
Reducing information asymmetry between investors and the firm is the primary goal of audit 
committee disclosures. 
 Also, respondents argue that the proposed disclosures will be useful to investors as they 
will have more knowledge about the audit committees’ oversight activities. Knowing more about 
the different activities, the investors will be in a better position to evaluate the performance of 
the audit committees and will have better ability to make investment decisions. This will increase 
the investors’ confidence. The proposed disclosures will assure investors as to how the audit 
committee acquitted itself of its fiduciary duty and about auditor independence, thus leading to 
higher confidence. 
 Finally, academic respondents emphasize that the additional disclosures requirement will 
provide audit committees with the ability to differentiate their disclosures. Investors will have the 
opportunity to observe differences across firms and will thus be able to benchmark them. 
Updating the current requirements and having additional disclosures on a voluntary basis will 
transform audit committee disclosure into a signaling device. The AAA comment letter discusses 
the importance of sending signals via credible disclosure as investors cannot observe the 
underlying quality of the audits. Signaling plays a vital role as it gives credibility and proper 
functioning of the audit market. Without such signals, there is a high risk that auditing becomes a 
market for lemons:  
“audit committee disclosures will vary – and it is such variation that offers information 




3.4.3 Management Respondents and Legal Respondents Frame: Investors are Fully Aware of 
Audit Committees Work and how it Fulfills their Interests…Maintain the Current Status Quo 
The management and legal respondents’ views are presented below. We combine their 
positions in this section as they overlap to a large extent. 
3.4.3.1 Diagnosis 
Management and legal respondents diagnose the current setting as providing useful and 
relevant information for investors regarding audit committees oversight of the financial reporting 
process in general or external auditors in particular. In their view, it is more than sufficient 
information for investors. For example, the Vice President and Controller of Ball Corporation11 
argues that: 
“…in general, we believe the current information reported by audit committees is 
sufficiently useful for investors to understand the responsibilities and activities of the 
audit committees in regard to their responsibility to provide oversight of the auditor.”  
Respondents believe that investors are receiving the needed information. In case they do not get 
the required information, investors can ask for it as there is high engagement between audit 
committees and investors. Also, the Vice President and Controller of ConocoPhillips suggests 
that investors can take action against the audit committees or auditors in case of dissatisfaction: 
“Specifically, if there is an actual or perceived lack of transparency or decision-useful 
information, investors can and do communicate their concerns to the board and senior 
management. If the board disregards these concerns, the investor remedy is to withhold 
support from the members of the audit committee or to vote against the audit firm.” 
Accordingly, investors can use their voting power against the audit committee members or the 
external auditor; thus it is in the primary interest of audit committees to engage with the 
stakeholders and provide them with the appropriate disclosures. 
 Furthermore, management and legal respondents point to the fact that audit committees 
have recently enhanced their disclosures by providing voluntary disclosures beyond the current 
audit committee disclosure requirements. Thus, they do not perceive a market demand for 
additional information as the investors are already obtaining the required information.  
                                                 
11 Multinational manufacturer of metal packaging products and of aerospace 
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Overall, management and legal respondents perceive that the current setting is idealistic 
as investors can, at any time, request any information and audit committees are responsive to 
their needs due to the voting power in the hands of investors who can take proper action in case 
of dissatisfaction. 
3.4.3.2 Prognosis  
Management and legal respondents prognose the proposed disclosures as harmful to 
investors and other stakeholders. They disagree with every single proposed enhancement. Brian 
Lebrecht12 describes the concept release as follows: 
“The Commission’s proposal goes too far, and is in effect a solution looking for a 
problem.” 
This view implies that investors are receiving perfect information about the audit committees’ 
activities realized during the year to protect their interests. For management and legal 
respondents, there is no room for improvement. In their letter, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP13 
mentions the investors’ call for additional disclosures rests on the premise that it will foster 
greater transparency; however, they are still not convinced: 
“We are concerned that the proposed new disclosures do not appear to be based on any 
empirical evidence that the existing audit committee reporting model has been ineffective 
relative to the quality and utility of information available to investors.” 
Despite investors’ request for additional disclosures to meet their needs, management and legal 
respondents are not persuaded of such a need. They prefer to keep the status quo as it better 
serves investors’ needs. 
 Also, management and legal respondents believe that the improvement in audit 
committee disclosures already took place through voluntary disclosures in the past few years. For 
the time being, there is no need for changing the current requirements. In case audit committees 
perceive the need for additional disclosures, it should be at their discretion. As stated by the 
Senior Vice President General Counsel of Raymond James14: 
                                                 
12 An attorney in private practice 
13 An international law firm 
14 A leading diversified financial services company 
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“audit committees would be able to provide the information which it believes is most 
important and relevant based upon each company’s particular situation, instead of what 
most likely will become standard boilerplate disclosures.” 
Respondents want the audit committees to decide for themselves on the disclosures that are 
beneficial for investors; they do not want investors to mandate disclosures according to their 
investment needs or voting decisions. 
 As a summary, management and legal respondents take a position that is entirely against 
any change in the current audit committee disclosure requirements. They refuse every proposed 
change in the concept release and do not suggest any enhancement. According to them, investors 
are already fully aware of audit committees’ activities and do not need any additional 
information.  
3.4.3.3 Motivation 
Management and legal respondents urge the SEC not to adopt the proposed 
enhancements in the final decision. First, to refute the need for enhancements, the respondents 
contradict investors who are urging for additional disclosures by claiming that investors are 
actually not interested in these disclosures. They advance the argument that all the details that the 
concept release is promoting are not the investors’ main interest. For example, the President of 
Safeco Corporation states: 
 "Shareholders and investors are only concerned that the auditors are a reputable and 
known firm and that their audit committees are comprised with competent and 
independent directors who meet the requirements of the SEC regarding financial acumen 
etc. So any further disclosures referred to in the Concept Release would be of no interest 
to the shareholders and investors." 
This contradicts the investors’ viewpoint that they are in the dark and need to know more 
information about the auditors’ oversight and audit committee activities. Investors’ comment 
letters show that they are not only concerned about the reputation and name of the audit firm; but 
also want to have further details about other relevant facts that are promoted in the concept 
release.     
 Second, management and legal respondents take a paternalistic approach towards 
investors. They are very concerned about investors who may be negatively affected by the 
proposed additional disclosures. The respondents claim that these disclosures will be creating 
30 
 
misunderstanding among investors, leading investors to draw the wrong conclusions and 
comparisons, confusing investors and, potentially harming them. The Vice President and 
Corporate Secretary Chief Governance Counsel of Pfizer Inc expresses her concerns towards the 
investors: 
 "…these types of disclosures could harm a company's shareholders without providing any 
 tangible benefit." 
Third, management and legal respondents presented several unintended consequences 
that the proposed disclosures can bring to the different stakeholders. As the concept release 
focuses on disclosing the communication between the auditors and audit committees, the 
respondents are concerned that this will not benefit investors. On the contrary, it is argued that it 
will chill the communication between the auditors and audit committees since they will know the 
content of their communication will be disclosed to the public. Even though investors are eager 
to have additional disclosures that address the communication between auditors and audit 
committees in their meetings, the Corporate Controller of MasterCard Incorporated discuss the 
negative consequences: 
“Requiring the number of private sessions or the topics discussed at such sessions to be 
publicly disclosed would most likely have an adverse effect on the communication 
between an audit committee and its independent auditor.” 
These negative consequences will affect the communication which in turn will affect the quality 
of the audit committee oversight of the external auditor. Similarly, the limited communication 
will reduce the oversight capabilities of the audit committee. Instead of benefiting investors, 
these disclosures are going to expose them to a higher risk since audit committees are likely to 
get less information from their auditors.   
Another unintended consequence that management and legal respondents raise is the 
higher litigation risk that will affect the auditors and audit committees. They argue that the 
additional disclosures will increase the information that may not be wholly understood by 
investors and lead to litigation issues. Edward Horahan, an attorney practicing in Washington, 
expresses such a view:  
“the more specific a required disclosure the more likely that the work of the audit 
committee and the auditor might be second-guessed in expensive litigation.”   
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The higher litigation will impact investors negatively as audit committee members will refrain 
from serving on audit committees, as specified in the letter of Pfizer: 
“it is possible that in our litigious environment, audit committees could become subject to 
litigation for not disclosing something that an investor thought they should have, which 
could make it even more difficult to find quality members.” 
Having less qualified audit committee members will reduce its oversight quality, an outcome that 
is not beneficial for investors. Similarly, respondents are concerned about litigation that can 
affect the audit engagement partners since their names will be disclosed. With the apparent aim 
to protect investors from themselves, management and legal respondents are concerned about the 
potential harm that can affect audit committee members and engagement audit partners which in 
turn will negatively impact investors. 
 Furthermore, the respondents believe that the information provided with the new 
disclosures will obscure the environment for investors. The Executive Vice President and Chief 
Accounting Officer of Metlife Inc comments the following: 
“However, more required disclosures, mandated by a blanket rule, could inhibit, rather 
than assist, transparency. New requirements may lead to generic disclosures that do not 
reflect the proper context of relevant circumstances, and will not necessarily facilitate 
meaningful comparisons.”  
Investors who call the audit committees to provide more disclosures to increase transparency and 
reduce the information asymmetry will be faced with less transparency and higher information 
asymmetry due to the generic disclosures that do not provide useful information. 
 Respondents urge the SEC not to change the requirements as there is a cost involved with 
the additional disclosures. Even though investors and shareholders, the actual owners of the 
companies, are requesting these disclosures, respondents point to the costly process that will be 
incurred by the companies. 
  Finally, management and legal respondents do not envision that the additional disclosures 
will benefit investors as they lack context. The additional disclosures will be mainly increasing 
the boilerplate verbiage which will not improve investors’ financial environment. The new 
information will not be relevant to investors voting which is one of the primary goals of the 




“We challenge whether additional audit committee disclosures regarding their 
relationship with the auditor or with management would provide useful information to 
inform investment or voting decisions, and it may lead to boilerplate disclosures.” 
This statement contradicts the SEC concept release that is proposing the enhancement for the 
sake of investors who are requesting these disclosures to improve their voting for investment 
decisions and board elections as well as for the ratification of the external auditor. 
 Overall, the management and legal respondents’ frame shows that investors are receiving 
all the information they need. Investors are fully aware of audit committees’ activities that fulfill 
their duties to protect investors interests. Investors’ needs are completely met within the current 
audit committee disclosure requirements. Nothing needs to be made to improve the current 
situation; otherwise, there are a lot of unintended consequences that can affect the investors and 
other stakeholders negatively. 
3.4.4 Audit Committees’ Respondents Frame: Investors are Fully Aware of Audit Committees’ 
Work that Fulfill their Interests… Maintain the Status Quo but Open to Some Changes 
 The audit committees’ respondents share the management and legal respondents’ 
viewpoint with some exceptions as they express an openness to adopt some of the proposed 
enhancements, albeit with some modifications. Some of the respondents even offer their own 
enhancement that they believe would benefit their shareholders or future investors. 
3.4.4 .1 Diagnosis 
In general, audit committees’ respondents diagnose that the current set of audit 
committee disclosures meets investors’ needs. Several arguments are raised in this regard. First, 
the respondents believe that investors are receiving useful and relevant information that allows 
them to know about the activities undertaken during the year to protect their interests. For 
example, the chair of the audit committee of Beleden Inc mentions that: 
"Our audit committee report provides sufficient information for the Company's investors 
and other stakeholders to gain an understanding of our responsibilities and our execution 
of them." 
 Second, audit committees’ respondents express the view that investors’ needs are 
satisfied as they can question the audit committees, which will then provide them with the 
requested information. Thus, investors are always informed and not left uninformed. Audit 
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committee respondents argue that whenever investors are in doubt or have some questions, they 
are directly provided with clarification through voluntary disclosures. As a result of the direct 
communication to investors in clarifying any ambiguities, audit committee respondents do not 
think that they need additional information since it has been already taken into account.  
 Third, respondents mention that voluntary disclosures by audit committees have been 
increasing in recent years. They cite reports by EY and KPMG that quantify the increase of these 
disclosures. The primary purpose of such voluntary information is to guide investors in their 
decisions. The audit committee chair of Comcast Corporation15 discusses the importance of 
voluntary disclosures: 
“We provide voluntary disclosures not only regarding Audit Committee oversight of our 
independent auditor, but also regarding other Audit Committee oversight areas. While we 
have insufficient evidence to determine whether and/or how investors use this 
information to inform their investment or voting decisions, we believe it is important that 
this information be available.” 
The voluntary disclosures are enlightening the investors to meet their needs. 
Furthermore, audit committee respondents raise the bar of their commitment to investors 
by focusing on their fiduciary duty. They stress their essential role in protecting investors’ 
interests and describe themselves as accomplishing their role perfectly. The audit committee 
members of CNO Financial Group Inc stress the performance of audit committees: 
“We believe that audit committees in general are fulfilling their fiduciary responsibilities 
in an exemplary manner.”   
 Overall audit committee respondents diagnose the current disclosures’ setting as meeting 
investors’ needs. Investors are getting useful and relevant information for their decision making. 
3.4.4 .2 Prognosis 
  Similar to management and legal respondents, audit committee respondents prognose that 
a change is not required since the disclosures are meeting investors’ needs. For instance, the 
chair of Autoliv Inc16 supports the status quo: 
“Additional disclosure regarding the audit committee’s oversight of the auditor should 
not be required by the Commission since sufficient information regarding the role of the 
                                                 
15 A global media and technology company with $68 billion in sales. 
16 Supplier of automotive safety equipment with sales of around $9 billion. 
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audit committee in overseeing the auditor is already provided by existing disclosure 
requirements.” 
Also, respondents believe that for their decision making, investors can refer to the audit 
committee charters that contain ample of information. 
 Hence, overall, audit committee respondents concur with management and legal 
respondents in rejecting the proposed disclosures enhancement as they consider that investors 
already have all the information they need. However, several audit committee respondents offer 
alternatives. They encourage firms and their audit committees to engage with investors to 
understand what can be done to serve better their needs. For example, Edison International17 
chair of the audit committee is not entirely against the change: 
“Furthermore, companies should be encouraged to engage with shareholders to discuss 
their views on proxy disclosure, among other areas, and make improvements based on 
direct feedback from shareholders.” 
Several audit committee respondents agree with the idea to engage with the shareholders to 
ensure that they are getting all the needed information. Besides engaging with investors, the audit 
committee respondents also encourage the SEC to appoint a Blue Ribbon Committee whose 
purpose would be to get opinions from different stakeholders and assess the current situation. 
Even though the status quo was mainly offered as a prognosis, audit committee respondents do 
show some flexibility. The audit committee respondents are not against the change in case it 
serves investors’ needs as long as it is not overly prescriptive. They want to meet investors’ 
needs.  
 Finally, several audit committee respondents are not entirely against the change and put 
forward some additional disclosures that will meet investors’ needs. For example, Northrop 
Grumman18 audit committee chair shows openness in this regard: 
 "Although we have only had limited inquiries from our investors about this topic, we 
 believe certain financial statement users could benefit from additional insight into 
 processes followed by audit committees as they oversee the independent auditor, 
depending on the circumstances."  
                                                 
17 A large electric utility. 
18 A leading global security company with sales of $24 billion. 
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The audit committee chair is in accord with some, not all, of the additional disclosures. Even 
some of the respondents who are against the SEC concept release in general, they are considering 
to increase their voluntary disclosures in some areas. 
 Overall, the audit committee respondents prognose the status quo for the current 
situation. They believe it is the best solution since investors’ needs are already met. However, 
they show flexibility in increasing voluntary disclosures. They focus on specific aspects of 
disclosures that can be useful for the investors. 
3.4.4 .3 Motivation 
 Audit committee respondents seek to influence the SEC to adopt their point of view by 
raising arguments similar to those of the management and legal respondents. They argue that 
shareholders are not interested in these additional disclosures. Also, they present the unintended 
consequences of these additional disclosures that will affect the communication between the 
audit committees and the auditors, increase litigation risks, and reduce the extent of voluntary 
disclosures. They strive to influence the SEC by emphasizing the negative indirect impact of 
these disclosures. Within such a perspective, investors, audit committee members, and auditors 
will incur direct harm. 
 Also, audit committee respondents raise the argument that additional disclosures will 
provide redundant information. Calling it redundant information, respondents argue it is not 
advisable to expand mandated disclosure toward investors especially if it comes with several 
unintended consequences.   
 However, besides the same arguments that were raised by management and legal 
respondents to convince the SEC not to go forward with the proposed enhancements, audit 
committee respondents show flexibility in some of the proposed disclosures. They either agree 
with some of the disclosures proposed by the SEC or they suggest other disclosures. Several 
respondents agree with the disclosures as they recognize its importance for the investors in 
evaluating audit committees in the financial reporting oversight or in increasing transparency 
toward investors and giving them higher confidence. The audit committee chairman of Comcast 
Corporation, who has voluntarily disclosed additional information about its activities in the past, 
specifies the reason for this practice: 
“We believe that greater transparency regarding the Audit Committee's roles and 
responsibilities provides us an opportunity to communicate more clearly with 
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shareholders about Audit Committee-related activities and to increase investor 
confidence.” 
Other audit committee respondents support the SEC proposed disclosures as they want to 
enlighten investors with information related to specific processes. For example, Northrop 
Grumman audit committee chair supports the SEC in disclosing certain processes such as the 
selection of the auditor or the factors underlying a decision to request a shareholder vote. Several 
audit committee respondents are showing this flexibility towards certain additional disclosures as 
they consider it will increase their engagement with the investors and meet their needs. 
 Overall audit committee respondents encourage the SEC not to change the current 
requirements. According to them, investors are not interested; thus the additional disclosures will 
not contribute to serving investors’ needs. On the contrary, additional disclosures will create 
several unintended consequences and will harm investors and other stakeholders. However, 
several respondents show flexibility to some of the proposed disclosures and argue that it will 
meet investors’ needs by increasing transparency and investors’ confidence.   
3.4.5 External Auditors’ Frame: Investors in the Dark…A Change is Needed to Serve Better 
Investors Needs   
3.4.5.1 Diagnosis 
 The external audit respondents diagnose the current situation as not serving investors’ 
needs. They recognize that investors are left in the dark as the current requirements are weak and 
inadequate. This is caused by information received that is not reflective of the audit committee 
activities and which does not assist the investors in their voting decisions. WeiserMazars19 
argues that the current requirements are not meeting investors’ expectations: 
“We see there is a clear expectation gap in the current rules as they do not provide 
meaningful insight into how audit committees execute their critical responsibilities as 
overseers of the integrity of a company's accounting and financial reporting process.” 
   Another point that is raised by external audit respondents is that the current audit 
committee disclosure requirements are outdated as they were promulgated in 1999 and 
significant changes happened since then. Grant Thornton LLP discusses the changes that took 
place and affected the audit committees role:    
                                                 
19 Independent member audit firm of Mazars Group.  
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“There have been significant changes to the role and responsibilities of audit committees 
related to oversight of the independent auditor, stemming from changes in the securities 
laws, including the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002...” 
 Finally, external audit firms pinpoint the progress that took place through voluntary 
disclosures. Even though investors are currently left in the dark, respondents mention the 
voluntary disclosures as a vehicle that benefitted investors. According to Deloitte, market forces 
are already driving these disclosures towards the right direction to enlighten investors: 
“Some of these trends may be relevant to consideration of any regulatory action in this 
area.”  
Respondents argue that the trend of audit committee voluntary disclosures that started in the last 
couple of years is a sign of the need to change to meet the investors’ needs. 
 Overall, external audit firms are aligned in stating that the current situation is not serving 
investors as it does not provide useful information for their voting and investment decisions.  
3.4.5.2 Prognosis 
 In proposing a solution for the current situation, the external auditor respondents believe 
that audit committee disclosure requirements need to change. The status quo is not suitable as it 
does not serve investors. Piercy Bowler Taylor & Kern (PBTK), a CPA firm, applauds the SEC 
initiative and sees it is a step in the right direction: 
“Although we view the additional disclosure requirements under consideration in the 
Release, in general, as significant improvements over the status quo, we are compelled to 
observe that no matter how extensive they may be, enhanced disclosure requirements can 
only be a small step in the right direction.”  
PBTK sees the change as the only solution to solve the problem of investors who are not 
receiving useful information. 
 EY hosted several meetings with various stakeholders to collect insight into the current 
situation and reflect on solutions. The attendants suggested the following:   
“One key takeaway was that audit committees could be more effective in communicating 
to investors what they do and how they do it. At the core, we believe the issue is one of 
communication, and we commend the SEC for considering how to best address it.” 
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 The respondents do not agree with all the proposed enhancements in the concept release. 
They suggest that the SEC impose some additional disclosures but favor a principle-based 
approach. For example, McGladrey LLP supports the change:  
“We therefore believe a voluntary approach, rather than a prescriptive approach, to audit 
committee reporting would result in achieving the most appropriate level of transparency 
with the fewest unintended consequences.”  
 External auditor respondents do not accept all the SEC proposed disclosures; however, 
they provide different approaches for new disclosures. For example, they suggest disclosing the 
qualifications of the internal audit directors and characteristics of the internal audit department. 
Also, some of the respondents recommend disclosing the inspection regime of the audit firm as it 
provides insight to investors. Others propose disclosing policies and procedures of the audit 
committee. All these proposals aim to fulfill investors’ needs; thus they become better informed 
about the audit committees activities. 
 External auditors respondents object to several of the proposed disclosures that affect 
them directly; however, they are not radical in their objections. For example, a majority of 
respondents objects to the inclusion of the engagement partner name by mentioning that it is not 
useful or beneficial for investors; however, they do not present extreme unintended 
consequences in their analysis. PwC does not object to several proposals as it argues its role is to 
enhance transparency. The firm mentions that its action in the past demonstrates this role as on 
an annual basis, it voluntarily discloses “Transparency Data Points” that provide insights into 
audit practices and quality. Also, it supports disclosing the audit partner name and changing the 
auditor’s report. All these activities aim to enhance transparency and meet investors’ needs.     
 Overall, respondents do not believe in the status quo and encourage the SEC to undertake 
a change as it will be assisting investors to move from the current state to a situation in which 
they are better informed and can make better decisions. Respondents do not accept all the 
proposed disclosures; they reject several of them. However, they see a change is needed and 
accept some of the enhancements and suggest other ones. 
3.4.5.3 Motivation 
 External auditor respondents attempt to motivate the SEC for not adopting some of the 
proposed disclosures. They raise several arguments similar to the management and legal 
respondents and the audit committee respondents. They argue that some suggestions are costly to 
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disclose; thus the SEC should consider the cost of raising disclosure requirements. In this line of 
arguments, Crowne Horwath20 discusses that some of their clients, mainly middle market 
companies, will be more affected by the cost. The cost will be impacting investors in mid-market 
companies more than investors in firms with large stock market capitalization; thus the 
additional disclosures may not be beneficial for them. 
 Also, external audit respondents raise several arguments related to unintended 
consequences. Their concern is that the proposed changes may chill the communication between 
them and the audit committees since the discussions will be disclosed to the public. KPMG is 
concerned about this issue and about disclosing matters that are not appropriate for disclosure: 
“Required disclosure of such discussions may reveal proprietary information about the 
issuer or the audit methodology and would surely chill communications between the 
auditor and the audit committee.” 
Auditors do not have an interest in disclosing their audit methodology so that management does 
not know their different procedures. Disclosing such information will reduce the audit 
effectiveness and may undermine the audit quality which will impact investors negatively.  
 Moreover, some external audit respondents argue that the proposed disclosures will not 
be informative for investors as they lack context to understand these disclosures. BDO does not 
favor the disclosure of information related to audit committee oversight of the external auditor 
that investors will not be able to understand since they lack proper context: 
“These subjective areas require the proper context to understand how such decisions are 
made collectively between the auditor and the audit committee. 
 External auditor respondents point out several benefits that the proposed disclosures will 
bring to investors. Respondents argue that the disclosures will increase investors’ confidence in 
the work of the audit committees. Investors will know more details about the audit committee 
activities and will be able to assess the committee’s performance. Deloitte mentions some of the 
benefits to the investors: 
“…providing additional insight into the structure and key activities of the audit 
committee can help increase investor confidence both in the audit committee and the 
company as a whole.  
                                                 
20 An audit firm with over 100 domestic registrants, most are middle market companies 
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Such confidence will improve the well-functioning of capital markets as investors’ needs are 
being met. Similarly, the respondents argue that the additional disclosures will inform the 
investors about the audit committee activities and will give them evidence that they are acting in 
shareholders’ best interests. EY perceives that the additional disclosures will explain to the 
investors how they are being protected through strong corporate governance practices: 
“Such disclosures would help investors assess whether the audit committee met its 
corporate governance obligations.” 
Moreover, the proposed disclosures will improve the functioning of audit committees as they 
will have benchmarks to navigate through to reduce criticism of not meeting investors needs. 
The investors will benefit as the audit committees will be able to set their goals and gauge their 
performance. 
 Overall, external audit respondents raise the issue that investors’ needs are not met with 
the current disclosure requirements. They agree that investors are in the dark and that a change is 
needed. They present arguments to convince the SEC not to implement all the proposed 
disclosures as it will not benefit the investors. They take a protective approach towards the 
investors who will be affected negatively by the proposed disclosures. However, their approach 
is not radical as they suggest some changes to the SEC that can benefit investors and move them 
from the current dark situation. 
3.5 Discussion  
3.5.1 Frames’ Comparison  
Figure 1 portrays the respondents’ frames. The horizontal axis measures whether the 
current audit committee disclosures meet the investors’ needs. The vertical axis measures 
whether a change is needed. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 The frames’ comparison reveals that investors, academia, and external auditor have a 
common point of view that the current audit committee disclosures do not meet the investors’ 
needs. However, they disagree on the extent of the change needed to rectify the current 
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situations. The investors exaggerate the need for change in their requests as they perceive there is 
an urgency for all the SEC proposed disclosures. The academia respondents also prognoses for a 
major change in current disclosures, but, at a lesser scale.  While external audit respondents do 
not agree with all the changes, they accept some of them and suggest other ones. In contrast, 
management, legal, and external audit respondents concur in arguing that “investors’ needs” are 
met entirely within the current audit committee disclosure setting. However, they do not agree on 
the extent to which change is needed. Management and legal respondents are in favor of the 
status quo; they exaggerate in rejecting all the proposed enhancements. Audit committee 
respondents are also against the change, but they show some flexibility in accepting some of the 
disclosures as they perceive the usefulness to investors. 
 Analyzing the reasons for the different views among the respondents can be explained by 
some prior research. Within an agency perspective, investors request additional disclosures to 
reduce the level of information asymmetry between them and management (Diamond & 
Verrecchia, 1991; Healy & Palepu, 2001a; Shroff, Sun, White, & Zhang, 2013). Since the 
current requirements are not satisfactory to reduce information asymmetry, investors agree with 
every single proposed disclosure. In contrast, management has incentives to reduce disclosures 
as it can benefit from information asymmetry (Beyer, Cohen, Lys, & Walther, 2010; Fama & 
Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Thus, they are satisfied with the current minimal 
requirements of the audit committee disclosures and oppose all the proposed disclosures. 
Similarly, legal respondents, who are presented within the same frame as management 
respondents, are against the change. Prior research suggests that less disclosure is safer as it will 
implicate a lower number of litigations (Baginski, Hassell, & Kimbrough, 2002; Beyer et al., 
2010). Legal respondents prefer to keep the disclosure requirements minimal for lower litigation 
risk. External auditors are usually in line with their employers, the shareholders, on proposed 
accounting or regulatory changes (Saemann, 1999). Accordingly, they agree with investors that 
their needs are not served with the current disclosures. However, they do not agree with all the 
changes since most of the enhancements in the concept release are related to the auditor 
oversight. The proposed disclosures will be affecting the external auditors as the proposed 
changes require audit committees to disclose how they oversee the external auditors. External 
auditors reject most of the disclosures; however, as they are aligned with investors that the 
current setting is not serving investors’ needs, they accept some of the enhancements and suggest 
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other ones that can be useful to the investors. Finally, the audit committees are usually aligned 
with the shareholders since they are a subset of the board that is responsible for overseeing the 
financial reporting process and protecting the investors’ interests (Saemann, 1999). In this 
particular case, they are not aligned with the investors since they are the most affected by these 
enhancements as they have to adapt them by totally revamping their disclosure practices. Audit 
committee respondents diagnose that the current disclosure requirements are meeting investors’ 
needs. Thus, on the core issue underlying the SEC concept release, they are at the opposite side 
of investors. However, they show flexibility in increasing disclosures on a voluntary basis 
focusing on some aspects that can be useful to investors. In this next section, we conduct a 
discourse analysis of the arguments that were raised in the respondents’ frames. 
3.5.2 Discourse Analysis 
3.5.2.1 Financial Cost 
 A main topic that is covered in all the frames is the financial cost impact of the enhanced 
disclosures. On the one hand, the investors’ respondents perceive that the enhanced disclosures 
come without additional expenses or relatively minimal cost as gathering the information and 
drafting it in a report is not costly. The academic respondents emphasize the consequences of the 
disclosures enhancement. They encourage the SEC to proceed with the disclosure enhancements 
as it will benefit the financial markets in reducing the cost of debt and cost of equity. Academic 
research encourages the enhancement of disclosures since it reduces the cost of debt and equity 
(Botosan, 1997; Botosan & Plumlee, 2002; Bravo Urquiza, Abad Navarro, & Trombetta, 2012; 
Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, & Yang, 2011; Francis, Nanda, & Olsson, 2008). On the other hand, the 
opponents of the disclosures enhancements emphasize on financial cost as a major obstacle to 
proceed with the SEC suggested enhancements. In their discourse, they emphasize purely on the 
financial cost aspect that may be affecting auditors and audit committees. They disregard the 
investors who perceive great benefits that can be derived from these disclosures. The Corporate 
Controller of MasterCard Incorporated is mainly concerned about the auditors additional cost 
that may be incurred: 
“Audit firms may increase the level of testing or audit effort beyond what it needed to 
complete and sign an opinion under current professional standards…” 
43 
 
Even though investors would be happy that auditors are increasing their testing and audit efforts, 
the opponents of the disclosures enhancements are against it due to cost considerations.  
 Second, the opponents’ discourse emphasizes the litigation aspect. According to them, 
the increased level of disclosures will increase the chances that firms will be sued as information 
can be misinterpreted. Thus, the litigation expenses will be higher, and consequently, the 
investors are in a worse situation.  
 Third, the opponents of the disclosures enhancements discuss that increasing the audit 
committee disclosures entails additional cost as companies need to hire more staff who will be 
involved in collecting information and drafting the disclosures. Thus, the additional cost will be 
incurred, and the investors have to pay for it. 
3.5.2.2 Defining Roles 
 The discourse of the respondents attempts to define roles of the shareholders and audit 
committees. Among all the different respondents, only the investors’ discourse reiterates on the 
fact that the shareholders are the “owners” of the firms and they aim to act as owners by 
overseeing the audit committee activities. Norges Bank investment management emphasize on: 
“Increased transparency may help investors act as considered owners, i.e., assessing 
company boards and management and the strategies for the longer term.”  
Only the investors’ respondents define themselves as “owners” while the other respondents do 
not mention or describe them as “owners” of the firms.  
 As for the “fiduciary duty” role of the audit committee, it was revealed in the 
respondents’ discourse. On the one hand, the audit committees’ respondents diagnose that they 
are bound by their fiduciary duty to protect investors' interests. They describe themselves as 
carrying their duties in an "exemplary manner" on behalf of the investors. It is in line with prior 
research that suggests that reputable directors want to perform their fiduciary duties in the best 
way they can in order to preserve their reputation (Armstrong, Guay, & Weber, 2010; Bugeja, 
Fohn, & Matolcsy, 2016; Hahn & Lasfer, 2011). For audit committee's respondents, disclosures 
referring the investors to the audit committee charters are enough to provide confidence that their 
oversight role is accomplished.  
       On the other hand, in their frame, the investors respondents diagnose the current 
disclosures not meeting their needs as they cannot verify whether the audit committees 
accomplish their fiduciary duty role or not. For investors, they reject the "fiduciary duty" role 
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that provides a warranty that audit committees are acting on behalf of investors and protecting 
their interests. For investors, audit committee disclosures that refer to the charter is not a proof 
that audit committees accomplished all the listed duties and fulfilled their role. As stated by 
CalPERS:  
“Currently, the investor is referred to the charter, but there is no statement that the audit 
committee complied with all of the duties included in the charter.”  
Prior research describes the audit committees as institutional ceremonies for legitimacy purposes 
that give comfort that corporate governance mechanisms are applied (Beasley, Carcello, 
Hermanson, & Neal, 2009a). Instead of having the proper oversight that protects the investors’ 
interests, audit committee activities can be symbolic rituals (Beasley et al., 2009a; Spira, 1999). 
It then makes sense for investors to argue that their needs are not met with current disclosures 
that only refer them to audit committees’ charters. Investors want assurance that the charter is not 
part of the ritual purposes and that audit committees accomplished in reality these activities. 
3.5.2.3 Power 
3.5.2.3.1 Investors Power 
 The power notion is present in the respondents discourse. The non-investor respondents 
refer to the voting power in the hands of investors. They claim that the investors can vote against 
the audit committee members if they are not satisfied with the current audit committee 
disclosures. As stated in the management respondents frame, the investors have a full power to 
remedy inappropriate audit committee disclosures by "withholding support" and voting against 
audit committee members or audit firms. This view of investors having strong power by 
exercising their voting power to improve audit committees performance is discussed in prior 
research. Gal-Or, Hoitash & Hoitash (2015) discuss that shareholders vote can influence audit 
committees financial reporting oversight in mainly non-staggered boards. Also, Cai, Garner & 
Walkling (2009) find that shareholders votes lead to improvements in companies performance, 
and strengthen corporate governance mechanisms. Moreover, the study of Fischer, Gramlich, 
Miller, & White (2009) suggests that whenever the shareholders withheld their votes, it increases 
the likelihood of turnover in the board of directors and CEO.  
 However, the investors diagnose the current situation as receiving non-informative audit 
committee disclosures. They describe themselves as lacking the power to rectify the current 
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situation. Even though the shareholders can vote against the audit committee members in case of 
dissatisfaction, they do not as they aim to collaborate. As expressed by Hermes investment 
management investors are not satisfied with the current situation; however, they aim to 
collaborate and assist the board with its regular functions. 
3.5.2.3.2 Audit Committees’ Power 
 On the one hand, the investors’ respondents frame reveals that they have doubts about the 
audit committees’ power. They motivate the SEC to enhance the disclosures as the audit 
committees will be empowered while performing their role. They put forward the argument that 
the proposed disclosures will empower audit committees as suggested by CalPERS: 
 “The additional disclosures will give the audit committee greater power.” 
Several studies analyze the power of audit committees in performing their role. Beck & Mauldin 
(2014) suggest that there is a struggle in power between the audit committees and CFOs. In the 
presence of powerful CFOs, the audit committees are weaker in accomplishing their duties. The 
study discusses the existence of a complex relationship between the CFO and audit committees 
that the current regulations do not recognize. Similarly, Gendron, Bedard, & Gosselin (2004) 
report how the audit committees have to keep reminding and re-emphasizing to the external 
auditor that audit committees and not the management are the main driver over the external 
auditing. The relation between management and audit committees has been illustrated in prior 
research showing how the management controls audit committees by setting the meeting agendas 
with the external auditor (Spira, 1999). Thus, the investors’ concern in the comment letters about 
audit committees lacking power has been discussed in prior research. 
 On the other hand, the audit committees, management, and legal respondents believe that 
with Sarbanes-Oxley the audit committees have been empowered. Based on interviews 
conducted in 2006 with external auditors, they perceive that post-SOX era the audit committees 
have been significantly more active and powerful in certain aspects (Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, & 
Wright, 2010). Thus, they do not agree with the investors who show a need for empowering the 
audit committees in accomplishing their fiduciary duties. 
3.5.2.4 Audit Committees Independence 
In their comment letters, the investors are keen on having audit committees that are truly 
independent of management. Even though Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires audit committee 
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members to be independent of management, investors’ respondents insinuate that audit 
committee members may not be totally independent. In addition to investors’ respondents, 
Marcum LLP, an audit firm, has the same opinion:  
“Enhanced disclosure regarding whether directors are truly independent of management 
as a result of prior business or other relationships that are not a typical "related party" by 
definition.” 
It is not surprising that there are some doubts about the audit committee members’ independence. 
Cohen et al., (2008) discusses the issue that the top management of firms chooses the directors 
who are their close friends to curb their oversight activities. Bruynseels and Cardinaels (2013) 
suggest that even though audit committee members are independent in appearance, having social 
ties to the CEO or being selected by the CEO will reduce their oversight effectiveness. Similarly, 
Carcello, Neal, Palmrose & Scholz (2011) find that that CEO participation in selecting the audit 
committee members eliminates the benefits of audit committee apparent independence and 
financial expertise. In the comment letters to the SEC, the investors’ respondents are raising the 
same concern. Investors are requesting additional disclosures to ensure that the audit committee 
members are independent not only in appearance but also in fact. In addition to the literature, it is 
remarkable that several comment letters were drafted jointly by the audit committee and 
management. In light of the need for independence by governance stakeholders, it is surprising 
that six letters (representing 25% of audit committees’ letters) were jointly written by audit 
committees and management respondents. Even one letter among those was drafted by the Chief 
Accounting Officer and Secretary to the Board on behalf of the firm’s audit committee. This 
practice leads to question as to whether audit committees are truly independent of management. 
In response to the investors’ concerns, management, legal, and audit committee respondents do 
not doubt the independence of the audit committee members. They refer to SOX regulation in 
having only independent audit committee members. As specified by ex-president of Safeco 
Corporation: 
“Shareholders and investors are only concerned that … audit committees are comprised 
with competent and independent directors who meet the requirements of the SEC 
regarding financial acumen etc.”    
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3.5.2.5 Audit Committees’ Effectiveness 
 The discourse analysis reveals a discrepancy in views among the respondents regarding 
the audit committees effectiveness in performing their oversight role. The management, legal, 
and audit committee respondents emphasize the high performance of the audit committees in 
overseeing the financial reporting process. They perceive that audit committees are already 
abiding to their fiduciary duty towards shareholders and are implementing best practices. CNO 
Financial Group audit committee members believe that: 
 "audit committees in general are fulfilling their fiduciary responsibilities in an exemplary 
 manner." 
However, the investors have expressed several concerns in their comment letters.  First, 
the investors’ frame implies serious concerns regarding the quality of audit committees’ 
oversight. Investors’ respondents motivate the SEC to enhance the current audit committee 
disclosures as they need to get the assurance that the audit committees are conducting their work 
properly. Hermes Investment Management discusses that need: 
“We need to challenge audit committees to perform their role more fully and clearly on 
behalf of shareholders, and empower them to do so…” 
The investors’ position conforms to several studies that suggest that board members can be less 
inclined to challenge each other or the management. In periods of uncertainties, the audit 
committee may stress its ceremonial role (Beasley et al., 2009a; Cohen et al., 2008). Similarly, 
Brennan and Kirwan (2015) propose future research to assess the performance of audit 
committees to ensure they are genuinely protecting investors’ interests or if their oversight is a 
mere corporate ritual. For this reason, Hermes Investment Management perceives that the 
additional disclosures will be solving that issue: 
“We believe that increased disclosure described will provide some degree of insight into 
how the audit committee and audit firm are performing their respective roles to the 
benefit of shareholders.” 
 Second, investors’ respondents in their comment letters reveal that they do not know if 
the audit committees are involved in critical judgments and significant unusual transactions that 
can have a material effect on financial reporting. As explained by Norges Bank, investors want 
to know how audit committees perform in unusual situations: 
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“The audit committee reporting should sufficiently explain how the committee has 
discussed and considered significant accounting policies and practices, the interpretation 
of relevant financial reporting standards, critical accounting estimates, and significant 
unusual transactions.” 
Investors want to know if their interests are protected by having audit committees fully engaged 
in matters that can impact them significantly. Some studies suggest that the audit committees are 
not completely engaged in such matters. For example, audit committees are not engaged in 25% 
of the discussions related to audit issues and 35% of the discussions related to financial reporting 
issues (Beattie, Fearnley, & Hines, 2012). There is evidence that the audit committees are not 
engaged in matters that necessitate their involvement. Investors’ respondents perceive that the 
enhanced audit committee disclosures would solve that issue since audit committees will be 
obliged to report their involvement in these matters. These disclosures will illuminate the 
investors and assure them that their interests are protected. Similarly, it is suggested in material 
issues the audit committees do not play an active role. Mainly, they play a mediating role and 
assist in resolving a dispute (Salleh & Stewart, 2012). The management and external audit firm 
frequently negotiate without the audit committee presence unless the case is very material and 
not resolved between the two parties. Investors are not satisfied in not having the audit 
committees involved in disagreements between auditor and management who work on solving 
the conflict behind closed doors (Gendron & Bédard, 2006). These practices put investors at high 
risk. 
 Third, investors’ respondents and academic respondents’ frames raise the issue of audit 
firms that may not be performing well and are not properly overseen by audit committees. The 
council of institutional investors describes its concern:    
“CII members generally expect the independent audit to serve a greater function than a 
compliance exercise and to add value to long-term shareowners. Yet some audit 
committees may not always exert the degree of scrutiny on independent audits that share 
owners expect.” 
The current disclosures allow such audit committees to hide their mediocre performance, while 
the enhanced disclosures will not allow such practices. This observation was analyzed in the 
Hollinger Inc. case. This company had an audit committee with an impressive background, three 
independent financially literate members with extensive corporate experience who met several 
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times during the year. After the company suffered material losses and went bankrupt, it was 
revealed that there were substantial deficiencies in the audit committee oversight process 
(Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, & Neal, 2009b). The investors want to rectify the current 
situation of hiding the performance gap in the disclosures. Requiring audit committees to 
disclose “how” instead of “what” as proposed by the academia respondents frame will protect 
investors and make them less vulnerable to cases like Hollinger. Also, the investors respondents 
frame reveal their vulnerability as they are not sure whether the auditors are performing their 
work properly and if the audit committees are challenging them. The current disclosures do not 
require that audit committees describe how they oversee the external auditors and challenge 
them. The investors concern that audit committees do not challenge the external auditors to 
induce them to provide better audit quality is covered in prior literature. Turley & Zaman (2007) 
suggest that the audit committees do not challenge external auditors in their audit procedures and 
audit plans. They find that the external audit firms discuss their audit plans with the top 
management, then present it to the audit committee who usually do not request any adjustments. 
The audit committee questions are not challenging to the external audit and are not related to 
audit procedures. Mainly the questions are related to business issues. Similarly, when the 
external audit firms are finalizing the audit, the audit committee questions are not challenging 
and are very limited (Turley & Zaman, 2007). With the proposed enhancements, the investor and 
academic respondents expect that audit committees practices will change and start challenging 
the external audit firms. 
3.5.2.6 Limits of Accountability 
An important aspect in the frames of investors’ respondents and management and legal 
respondents is the exaggeration approach in their prognosis. Both show exaggeration in either 
refusing all or accepting all of the enhancements. 
 Both sides’ exaggeration leads us to think of the limits of accountability. Investors are 
pushing for greater accountability by the audit committees and for the disclosure of several 
details. For example, one of the proposed disclosures is to disclose “all” the communications 
between the auditor and audit committee. All of the audit committee respondents refuse this 




“maintaining necessary record keeping of each non-required or informal communication 
by the audit committee as well as the auditor in preparation for disclosure would add cost 
and administrative burden…” 
There is a limit to accountability otherwise it can have negative consequences (Messner, 2009). 
Investors are requesting audit committees to keep a record of each of the activities performed 
during the year and to disclose in their annual disclosures; such as communication with auditors, 
evaluation of the auditor, etc. It is an obligation for the audit committees which may not be 
feasible. In her book, Butler (2005) asks: “Can we expect, however, that one’s conduct can 
always be fairly represented and justified in narrative form?” This reveals the difficulty in 
recounting all the activities that took place during the year. It seems the investors are requesting 
too much disclosure from the audit committees who are faced with the limit of accountability. 
Audit committees are challenged with massive additional tasks leading them to be overloaded 
“to the point that the stool is no longer functional” as stated by the audit committee members of 
Home Depot.  
3.6 Recommendations 
 The respondents’ frames reveal that the different stakeholders do not have the same view 
of the “investors’ needs” in the context of the audit committee disclosures. They have conflicting 
views regarding whether the current situation is fulfilling the investors’ needs or not, and 
whether a change is required or not. After analyzing the respondents’ frames and respondents’ 
discourses, we come with several recommendations. 
First, several respondents suggest to the SEC to reconsider its proposed enhancements 
and appoint a Blue Ribbon Committee to investigate the current situation and whether a change 
is needed or not. The audit committee members of Microsoft believes a Blue Ribbon Committee 
composed of investors, audit committee members, audit firms, management, and governance 
organizations to consider the enhancements. Having a Blue Ribbon committee composed of 
experts representing the different stakeholders is essential for having well-rounded regulation: 
“Best practice audit committee reporting studies are still in an early stage of development 
and a Blue Ribbon Committee can expedite that development as well as ensure the best 
practices holistically consider the many responsibilities of audit committees.” 
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Even though the frames analysis reveal that the investors’ needs are perceived differently by 
different stakeholders, and investors are kept in the dark and vulnerable, it seems the SEC did not 
proceed in changing the current requirements since August 2015. Its rational may be that the 
voluntary disclosures have increased in the previous years; thus, there is no need to update the 
current requirements. Based on a large-scale textual analysis of audit committee reports of US 
firms extending from 2004 to 2015, the results suggest that the disclosures are not useful and 
require improvement (Draeger et al., 2018). A Blue Ribbon Committee will be able to capture all 
the different views and come up with a better understanding of the investors’ needs and ways to 
fulfill it in the context of audit committee disclosures. 
    Second, the SEC drafted the concept release as if it is encouraging the prescriptive 
approach. The comment letters respondents had this idea as the concept release is composed of 
74 questions that gave the illusion the SEC is encouraging the mandatory disclosures. All of the 
respondents are against such an approach as it will dampen the ability of audit committees to 
provide useful information to the investors. The audit committee collaboration is the first 
partnership that raised the issue of audit committee disclosures enhancements in 2012. Its 
president is against the SEC concept release since it is taking a very detailed prescriptive 
approach.   
Third, investors concerns and uncertainties are critical issues that have been discussed in 
the prior literature. It is a legitimate issue to raise whenever the investors feel the audit 
committees lack power, independence is jeopardized, or performance is not according to their 
expectations. It is time to consider these concerns seriously as it is coming from the investors 
who are not feeling protected in the US financial markets. 
3.7 Conclusion, Limitation, and Future Research 
 The chapter presents a content analysis of the comment letters received by the SEC in 
response to its issuance of a concept release on enhancing audit committee disclosure. The 
positions taken in the comment letters are interesting. Investors agree with the SEC’s plan to 
increase audit committees transparency. They urge the audit committees to improve the 
disclosures in order to understand the activities undertaken during the year and evaluate the 
oversight performance. By contrast, non-investors respondents – audit committees, management, 
legal advisers and auditors – are generally against the SEC proposed enhancements. They 
52 
 
perceive that the current audit committee disclosure requirements provide adequate information 
for investors. Disclosing additional disclosure will harm the investors since they may not be able 
to evaluate the information and become confused. 
 This study has several limitations. First, it relies on ninety-one comment letters drafted by 
investors and cross-section of governance actors. The number of comment letters is considered 
limited; thus it can be considered not representative of the different views. In qualitative 
research, the researcher stops collecting further information whenever feels there has been 
saturation of the different point of views. In this chapter, the saturation level may not have been 
reached. Second, the comment letters are drafted by different stakeholders; however they may 
have considered the public expectations, so the responses can be written in a way that is 
politically correct. Thus, the letters may be biased and not reflect the true intentions of the 
respondents. 
 The results of the study are interesting since they reveal the existence of major 
discrepancies by the respondents in viewing the "investors' needs" in the audit committee 
context. Also, several issues and concerns were mentioned by the investors that are related to the 
audit committees performance. Future research can be directed to understand the major 
challenges that the audit committees face by conducting interviews and surveys that tackle the 




Chapter 4: Voluntary Disclosures in the Audit Committee Report: Evidence 
from the US Bank Holding Companies 
4.1 Introduction 
 Chapter 3 analyzes the comment letters of the different stakeholders in a qualitative way. 
The responses reveal that there are opposing opinions regarding the usefulness of the audit 
committee reports. Investors describe that the current audit committee disclosures do not provide 
useful information about the audit committee activities and that the voluntary disclosures did not 
increase significantly in the past years. In contrast, the audit committee, legal, and management 
respondents believe that the current situation is optimal for the investors. In this chapter, we 
analyze the voluntary disclosures in the audit committee report in a quantitative way. Our sample 
consists of the top US bank holding companies. The banking industry is selected as the audit 
committees play a critical role in the banking context due to its complexity and importance in the 
economy. This study is composed of two parts. First, we analyze the association between 
voluntary disclosures in the audit committee report and earnings quality. Our aim is to assess if 
such disclosures provide incremental information that show strong performance by the audit 
committees, or it is an impression management practiced by the audit committees to hide their 
weak performance. Second, we investigate the effect of the voluntary disclosures in the audit 
committee report on the external environment. Mainly we analyze the effect of the voluntary 
disclosures on the implied cost of equity and on the financial analysts' forecasting properties. The 
SEC concept release points to the lack of research that analyzes the motives of audit committees 
to disclose beyond the current disclosure requirements, and whether the voluntary disclosures are 
useful for investors (Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 2015). The first part of the 
study fills the gap in research by analyzing the motives of the audit committees to disclose 
voluntary information in their reports. The second part of the study analyzes the impact of the 
audit committee voluntary disclosures on the cost of equity and its usefulness on the financial 
analysts’ information environment. The two parts of our study in this chapter aim to provide 
empirical evidence to the policy-makers about the current audit committees voluntary disclosures 
practices, audit committees motivation for disclosing voluntary information, and the effect of the 




4.2.1 Disclosure: Incremental Information or Impression Management 
In the corporate world, communication has an essential role in notifying external parties 
about a firm’s performance and the different events and transactions taking place. 
Communication implies the management of relationships with external groups such as various 
stakeholders (e.g., shareholders, creditors, suppliers, etc.) and the general public (Niamh Brennan 
& Merkl-Davies, 2013; Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2017). Accounting communication typically 
includes texts, numbers or other forms of disclosure (e.g., figures, graphs, etc.) (Davison, 2011; 
Hopwood, 1994; Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2017). In a more specific way, accounting 
communication research encompasses studies related to communication between companies and 
shareholders for decision-making or accountability (Parker, 2007). 
There is extensive research on corporate disclosure. Prior studies suggest that either the 
disclosures provide incremental useful information that improves investors’ decision-making, or 
the disclosures are deployed to provide biased information that misleads investors in their 
decision-making (Henry, 2008; Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2007). Using opportunistically the 
disclosures to impress the shareholders can cause incorrect capital misallocations and unfair 
gains by managers. Thus, the practice of impression management is a major issue affecting the 
governance of corporations (Huang, Teoh, & Zhang, 2013; Merkl-Davies, Brennan, & McLeay, 
2011).  
Impression management is a way to control and manipulate the impressions sent to 
accounting information users (Clatworthy & Jones, 2006; Hadro, Klimczak, & Pauka, 2017; 
Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2007). It is exercised by managers who want to benefit from 
information asymmetry. One way to perform impression management is to manipulate the 
disclosures to mislead users’ perceptions of corporate achievement by selectively selecting 
corporate narrative. Positive achievements are highlighted while negative performance is hidden 
(Cho, Roberts, & Patten, 2010; Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2011). The notion of impression 
management is rooted in social psychology and is mainly related to analyzing how persons 
present themselves and how they want to be perceived by others (Hooghiemstra, 2000). This 
concept is studied in accounting research to determine how managers present financial 
information through discretionary narrative disclosures in an intentional manner to distort annual 
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report users’ opinion about firm performance. So far, impression management has been analyzed 
mostly by researchers who viewed it from an economic perspective. They perceive narrative 
disclosures aiming for opportunistic economic gains (Leung, Parker, & Courtis, 2015; Merkl-
Davies et al., 2011). 
In contrast, the incremental information approach views market participants as being rational 
in a context based on market efficiency. Being rational, investors and analysts can anticipate 
future returns; thus, they are able to assess the bias in the narrative disclosures. Based on this 
assumption, impression management is not beneficial for managers who practice it, as it will lead 
to a higher cost of capital and diminish stock price due to the market rationale. Thus, impression 
management harms management who exercises it as their compensation is based on stock price 
performance. In other words, the promoters of the incremental information view do not believe 
that impression management exists. For them, the discretionary narrative disclosure is practiced 
to provide additional useful information (Baginski, Hassell, & Hillison, 2000; Baginski et al., 
2002; Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2011). 
4.2.2 Voluntary Disclosures and Cost of Equity 
The economic benefits of voluntary disclosures are not clear and there is a ongoing debate on 
this issue (Bravo Urquiza et al., 2012). Theoretically, investors will demand a higher return in 
case the firm disclosures are imperfect as they perceive a higher risk that needs to be 
compensated. However, if the firm is providing high-level disclosures leading to a lower level of 
information risk, the firm will incur lower cost of capital as investors will not require additional 
compensation (Healy & Palepu, 2001b). It is based on the economic theory that suggests that 
investors required return on their investment is lower whenever there is an improvement in 
voluntary disclosures. 
 The theory explains the inverse relationship between voluntary disclosures and cost of 
equity in several ways. First, the disclosures are essential for investors as it provides them with 
the tool to assess their investment. The voluntary disclosures reduce information asymmetries. 
Asymmetries exist as not all investors have the same access to information. Having investors 
with different levels of access to information will let them lose confidence in companies and 
consequently, they will require a higher return on their investment (Cormier, Ledoux, & 
Magnan, 2011; Cuadrado-Ballesteros, Garcia-Sanchez, & Martinez Ferrero, 2016). Increasing 
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the disclosure will create an environment that is more informative for all investors. Thus, 
disclosures reduce the information asymmetry that is a major element in the cost of capital 
(Healy, Hutton, & Palepu, 1999; Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000). Another view for the inverse 
relationship between disclosures and cost of equity is related to transaction costs. An 
environment characterized by low information implies higher transaction costs that lead to a 
decrease in market liquidity. Thus, investors will pay a lower price for shares which will increase 
a firm’s cost of capital (Amihud & Mendelson, 1986; Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al., 2016). 
Additional information increases investors’ interest in the firm and, consequently, reduces the 
cost of equity (Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991). The last view for the inverse relationship is the 
reduction of the investors’ estimation risk. Investors’ confidence is highly influenced by the 
disclosure level of the firms as investors utilize the disclosed information to estimate risk 
parameters (Poshakwale & Courtis, 2005).           
 Empirical evidence on voluntary disclosures’ effect on the cost of equity is mixed. Some 
studies suggest a negative relationship between voluntary disclosures and cost of capital 
(Amihud & Mendelson, 1986; Bravo Urquiza et al., 2012; Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991; Francis 
et al., 2008; Hail, 2002; Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000). Other studies suggest a negative relationship 
only in specific situations. For example, voluntary disclosure decreases cost of equity for firms 
that are followed by high number of analysts (Botosan, 1997), or firms that implement 
aggressive accounting policies (Gietzmann & Ireland, 2005), or firms increasing voluntary 
disclosures just before the issuance of seasoned equity offering (Hemmings, Brennan, & Merkl-
Davies, 2017). 
     However, several studies suggest that there is a positive association between voluntary 
disclosures and the cost of equity (Botosan & Plumlee, 2002; Bushee & Noe, 2000; Kim & 
Verrecchia, 1991; Richardson & Welker, 2001). This contradicts with the theoretical point of 
view. Several reasons may cause the conflict such as correlated omitted variables, small sample 
size, and endogeneity (Bravo Urquiza et al., 2012). In the case of Richardson and Welker (2001), 
the authors rationalize their contrary results as reflecting firms’ legitimizing strategies in the 
social disclosure context. Accordingly, the less profitable companies disclose more social 
information to boost their reputation, which is a form of impression management. 
57 
 
4.2.3 Voluntary Disclosure Effect on Cost of Equity and Financial Analysts' Information 
Environment 
Financial analysts play an important role in the capital markets as they collect public and 
private information to provide buy/sell recommendations to investors (Healy & Palepu, 2001a). 
Disclosures convey important information to financial analysts who can use it in their 
evaluations of the firms (Cormier & Magnan, 2015). Analysts prefer to evaluate firms that 
disclose better quality information which will reduce the cost of gathering information and 
improve analysts’ abilities to evaluate firms and predict future earnings (Abed, Abdallah, & 
Ismail, 2012). Financial analysts utilize different sources of information to evaluate firms such as 
financial or non-financial information (Hope, 2003). Non-financial information that analysts can 
use in their evaluations includes firm strategy, social responsibility, corporate governance, and 
internal controls (Orens & Lybaert, 2013).  
  Economic theory postulates that firms benefit from improved transparency via voluntary 
disclosures. The improved transparency leads to higher confidence by the different stakeholders 
of the firm (Cormier & Magnan, 2014; Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Orens & Lybaert, 2013), reduces 
the uncertainty faced by financial analysts when forecasting future earnings or cash flows (Leuz 
& Verrecchia, 2000), and makes financial analysts more knowledgeable about the firm (Hope, 
Thomas, & Winterbotham, 2006). There is a growing literature that studies the association 
between disclosures and the different properties of analysts’ forecasts. 
 The literature examines the association between disclosures and financial analysts’ 
forecasts. In general, a negative relationship exists between voluntary disclosures and financial 
analyst earnings forecast error (Orens & Lybaert, 2013).  For example, Lang and Lundholm 
(1996) show that the firms with additional disclosures enabled the financial analysts to have 
better forecast accuracy, less forecast dispersion, and less volatility in forecast revisions. 
Similarly, Hope (2003) investigate the disclosure level in the annual report using a cross-country 
sample. His results suggest that there is a positive relationship between the disclosures level and 
analyst forecast accuracy and less forecast dispersion. Moreover, the corporate governance 
disclosures effect on analyst forecast accuracy are analyzed. The study of Bhat, Hope & Kang 
(2006) finds that governance transparency is positively related to analyst forecast accuracy.  
 Even though the majority of the studies discuss a positive association between disclosures 
level and analyst forecast accuracy, other studies contradict with their results (Hao, Forgione, 
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Guo, & Zhang, 2017). For example, Chandra, Procassini & Waymire (1999) investigate 
voluntary disclosures by the industry trade association. Their results reveal an insignificant 
association between these voluntary non-financial disclosures and analysts forecast. They 
interpret these results as not reliable and not convincing for financial analyst since companies do 
not disclose critical information that competitors can take advantage of. Also, Simpson (2010) 
reveals that financial analysts underreact to non-financial disclosures related to firms’ customers. 
4.2.4 Banking Industry 
The banking industry provides a unique setting for analyzing audit committees reporting. 
First, the banking industry plays an important role in society as it is a major player in the 
financial system and the economy. It is considered the backbone of the economy, and if not 
properly governed, it can severely disrupt society and the economy (Howells & Bain, 2008).  
Strong governance and oversight of banks are needed for the whole financial system (Adams, 
2010). Not only investors are interested in the bank performance and its corporate governance, 
but also depositors and regulators have a direct interest (Adams & Mehran, 2003) 
Second, the banking industry represents a major portion of the stock market (Mohammad 
Jizi & Nehme, 2018). It is characterized by having higher information asymmetry than other 
industries due to the complexity of banking operations (Billingsley & Schneller, 2009). In 
addition to the complexity attribute, banking industry assets are relatively opaque as loan quality 
is not easily measured or observable (Ferrarini, 2015).  All this complexity in the banking 
business provides managers with a significant flexibility to manipulate earnings (Kanagaretnam 
et al., 2010).  
Third, as an outcome of such complexity, banks’ auditing is more difficult than auditing 
other industries  (Billingsley & Schneller, 2009). The difficulty in banks’ auditing is also 
confirmed by the AICPA which announced in 2006 that auditing the loan loss provision is 
among the most difficult task for auditors (Jin, Kanagaretnam, & Lobo, 2011). Moreover, a 
survey conducted in 2013 by the International Forum of Independent Audit Regulators 
concluded that the banks’ audits are “persistently riddled with flaws.” Even though the Big 6 
audit firms audited these banks’, these audits have deficiencies in auditing loan loss provisions, 
loan impairments, and assets valuations (Tepalagul & Lin, 2015).      
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Fourth, the banking industry is highly visible as it is heavily followed by investors and 
intensively regulated and monitored by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and 
the Federal Reserve Board. Consequently, any restatement of financial position or change in the 
bank performance can lead to major negative impact on the economy, investors, depositors, and 
the society (Ittonen et al., 2016). The financial statements are a major source for the regulatory 
bodies in detecting troubled banks or high-risk banks. Banks aim to have a proper financial 
reporting system in order not to be classified as troubled or high-risk bank, and avoid having on-
site bank inspectors whose role is to scrutinize their activities (Jin, Kanagaretnam, Lobo, & 
Mathieu, 2013).        
For all the above reasons, the audit committee function is critical within the banking 
context. The audit committee has an essential role in protecting the investors and the depositors 
by overseeing the financial reporting process and the external auditor. Thus, the audit committee 
report is an important communication tool that provides information about the activities of the 
audit committee during the year. 
4.3 Hypothesis Development 
4.3.1 Audit Committee Voluntary Disclosures, Incremental Information or Impression 
Management 
4.3.1.1 Board of Directors, Disclosure, and Impression Management 
Most prior research analyzes the monitoring role of the board of directors in mitigating 
impression management in disclosures by managers. These studies consider different 
characteristics such as the composition of the board (Mather & Ramsay, 2007; Osma & 
Guillamón-Saorín, 2011), CEO influence on the board or firm performance (Merkl-Davies & 
Brennan, 2007). On one hand, research shows that strong board of directors reduces the 
impression management in narrative disclosures as governance mechanisms monitor 
management disclosures (Osma & Guillamón-Saorín, 2011). It leads to an improvement in firm 
transparency and reduces overall impression management. This is in line with the incremental 
information approach that considers improvement in disclosures will reduces information 
asymmetry which in turn will reduce cost of equity and enhance share performance (Baginski et 
al., 2000; Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2007).  
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On the other hand, the evidence as to whether the board of directors’ practices impression 
management through disclosures is not as abundant as the ones related to management practicing 
impression management. For instance, some studies analyze whether the UK board of directors 
engage in impression management. In the UK, companies that do not comply with the UK 
corporate governance code have to provide explanation for the non-compliance. The boards of 
directors are responsible for drafting the explanations. The boards of directors engage in drafting 
misleading explanations instead of meaningful persuading explanations. Mainly, the directors 
strategize their rhetoric in a way that reduces the negative feelings and disguise the non-
compliance act to make it appear that the end justifies the means (Shrives & Brennan, 2015; 
Shrives & Brennan, 2017).  
Other studies discuss obfuscation practiced by the board of directors. With the introduction 
of the “remuneration report” in the UK which is the board of directors sole responsibility to 
draft, some studies investigate the writing style practices of the board of directors to assess if 
they intend to obscure information. Hooghiemstra, Kuang, & Qin (2017) suggest that UK boards 
of directors practice obfuscation of information in case of CEO excessive pay by decreasing the 
readability of the compensation report. In addition, Mangen and Magnan (2012) examine the 
debate surrounding the adoption of “Say on Pay” and suggest that boards of directors that have 
an incentive to maintain inefficient pay plans can manipulate compensation disclosure reports. 
Board of directors can ensure that compensation disclosures be perceived in line with 
shareholders’ interest. 
Furthermore, several research linked accountability report to impression management 
practices. These studies suggest that situations demanding accountability from a person or a 
group usually promote impression management practices. The person or the group will be 
rendering an account to the audience who will provide a verdict based on that account (Bozzolan, 
Cho, & Michelon, 2015; Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2011; Mélanie Roussy & Rodrigue, 2016). In 
our study, the audit committee report is an accountability instrument since the audit committee is 
directly accountable towards the shareholders; thus, it communicates to the shareholders about 
its activities through that report. Audit committee members communicate their oversight 
activities by giving an accounting of their actions to the audience (shareholders) (Schlenker, 
1997). Since there is an accountability context, the audit committee members will engage in 
impression management as they anticipate an evaluation by the shareholders for their conduct 
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during the year (Frink & Ferris, 1998; Merkl-Davies et al., 2011). This leads to the first 
hypothesis: 
H1: Audit committees who are accountable to shareholders will use voluntary disclosure in 
the audit committee report as a vehicle for impression management 
4.3.1.2 Banks’ Earnings Management 
The research on earnings management suggests that managers can use the accruals to 
manipulate income which will in return affect their bonuses (Healy, 1985). They can 
strategically smooth earnings by decreasing income through accruals in case the set target for 
their bonus is not reachable or has been already achieved. In the scenario where the income is 
lower than expected, the managers would manipulate accruals to increase earnings (Cornett, 
McNutt, & Tehranian, 2009). Earnings management can have an effect on stock prices which in 
turn will affect the wealth of management. Several studies suggest that the use of accruals to 
manage earnings is more dominant at companies whose managers compensation is more linked 
to stock market price (Bergstresser & Philippon, 2006; Cheng & Warfield, 2005). In the banking 
industry, the studies show that managers use primarily loan loss provisions as an earnings 
management tool (Cornett et al., 2009; Ryan, 2012).   
 Loan loss provisions are usually the largest accruals for banks (Bratten, Causholli, & 
Myers, 2017). They are used as an allowance for future losses on current loan portfolios. The 
loan loss provision signals the bank's credit losses estimation on current loans (Ryan, 2007). 
PCAOB stressed that "the allowance for loan losses is one of the most significant estimates made 
by many issuers in the financial service industry" (PCAOB 2010).  The practice of adjusting the 
loan loss provision levels between periods allows managers the discretion to use it as a tool for 
managing earnings. It is an accrual adjustment that affects directly net income of the bank by 
managers upon their discretion (Moyer, 1990). Several studies confirm that loan loss provision is 
used considerably by banks managers to manipulate earnings (Bratten et al., 2017; Fonseca & 
Gonzalez, 2008; Kanagaretnam, Lobo, & Yang, 2004). In this study, loan loss provision is 
utilized as a proxy for banks' financial reporting quality such as in prior studies (Kanagaretnam 
et al., 2010; Krishnan & Zhang, 2014). 
 Osma & Guillamon-Saorin (2011)  reveal that strong corporate governance limits 
impression management as monitoring would be stronger to reduce the self-interest disclosures 
of management. Similarly, other research suggests that impression management practiced by 
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management would be associated with a weak form of market efficiency and weak corporate 
governance (Courtis, 2004; Rutherford, 2003). Thus, we can conclude that impression 
management is a form of governance weakness.  
On the other hand, as discussed in H1, audit committees can use voluntary disclosure in 
the audit committee report as a vehicle for impression management. This is considered a 
weakness in corporate governance as manipulating disclosures for self-interest by the audit 
committee has more negative implication than when it is done by management. A weak 
corporate governance by the audit committee signifies it has lower monitoring quality; thus 
managers would be inclined to engage in earnings management whether increasing or decreasing 
earnings based on their discretion (Archambeault, DeZoort, & Hermanson, 2008). Based on this, 
we hypothesize the following: 
H2: Higher voluntary disclosure in audit committee report is associated with more 
aggressive financial reporting practices (income-increasing or income-decreasing) by 
managers based on their discretion.   
4.3.2 Audit Committee Voluntary Disclosures, Cost of Equity, and Financial Analysts Forecast 
Properties 
4.3.2.1 Cost of Equity and Voluntary Disclosures in the Audit Committee Report 
 The empirical results are mixed regarding the association between the voluntary 
disclosures and the cost of equity. On one hand, the economic theory proposes that the investors' 
required rate of return will be lower for firms with improved voluntary disclosures (Diamond, 
1985; Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991; Lundholm & Van Winkle, 2006). Voluntary disclosure is 
perceived as a response to the information asymmetry that exists between managers and 
investors; thus an inverse relationship exists between voluntary disclosures and cost of equity 
(Orens, Aerts, & Cormier, 2010). Mainly there are two explanations for the inverse relationship. 
First, an environment that is rich in information provides investors with better monitoring and 
forecasting capabilities (Clarkson, Guedes, & Thompson, 1996; Handa & Linn, 1993). Second, 
the enhanced quality of disclosures decreases transactions costs since trading by investors will be 
increased and liquidity of the company share will be enhanced (Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991; 
Easley & O'hara, 2004). 
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 On the other hand, other studies perceive the voluntary disclosures in a different way. 
Some studies analyze the voluntary disclosures effect on cost of equity in contexts that are close 
to impression management. For example, Leuz and Wysocki (2016) attempt to explain the 
positive relationship between voluntary disclosure and cost of capital. They suggest that 
managers with low performance will increase disclosures in order to explain the poor 
performance. Even though the voluntary disclosures increased, the cost of equity will remain 
high due to the poor performance. Furthermore, Larcker and Rusticus (2010) consider the firms 
in high risk and uncertain business environment. They believe that firms that are struggling and 
are in high risk and uncertain environments increase their voluntary disclosures in an attempt to 
reduce their cost of capital. However, even if these firms are partially successful, this maneuver 
will still lead to a positive relationship between disclosure and cost of capital. 
 The different views regarding the association between voluntary disclosures and cost of 
equity let us consider the reason behind the additional voluntary disclosures in the audit 
committee report. In our case: is the audit committee voluntary disclosures related to higher 
performance by the audit committee or is it mainly impression management by the audit 
committee to hide low performance? In our previous hypothesis, we hypothesize it is mainly an 
impression management practice. As discussed by Urquiza et al. (2012), the mixed results are 
caused by the motives of voluntary information disclosed. Studies are not considering whether 
the voluntary disclosures depict reality. If disclosures do not depict reality, then even though 
disclosures are augmenting in size but it will not reduce the cost of capital, on the contrary it will 
increase it (Bravo Urquiza et al., 2012). In the context of the audit committees engaging in 
impression management in the audit committee report, this leads to the third hypothesis: 
H3: The voluntary disclosure in the audit committee report will increase the cost of 
capital. 
4.3.2.2 Financial Analyst Forecast Accuracy and Voluntary Disclosures in the Audit Committee 
Report 
 The literature related to nonfinancial disclosures and analysts’ forecast accuracy is scarce 
and mix (Hao et al., 2017). On one hand, nonfinancial disclosures provides additional 
information to the financial analysts who will be able to make better forecast. For example the 
study of Vanstraelen, Zarzeski, & Robb (2003) suggests that there is a positive relationship 
between forward looking nonfinancial disclosures and financial analysts’ forecast accuracy and 
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less dispersion. On the other hand, some studies find that there is an insignificant relationship 
between nonfinancial disclosures and financial analysts’ forecast accuracy. Chandra et al., (1999) 
analyzes the impact of book-to-bill ratio which is a forward-looking industry-wide indicator that 
is disclosed by trade association. They find that there is an insignificant relationship between that 
forward-looking disclosure and financial analysts forecast. An explanation for this insignificant 
association is that investors may perceive nonfinancial voluntary disclosures as not reliable. 
Similarly, nonfinancial disclosures in the wireless industry such as customer acquisition cost, 
average revenue per user, and number of subscribers are not considered in similar way to other 
disclosure categories. Simpson (2010) suggests that financial analysts underreact to such 
nonfinancial disclosures related to customers. Her explanation is that nonfinancial voluntary 
disclosures may not be persistent on the long run.    
As for voluntary disclosures related to corporate governance, prior research discusses that 
strong corporate governance reduces information asymmetry and improves the accuracy of 
financial analysts’ forecasts. Firms are transparent when they disclose about their governance 
practices which assist financial analysts’ in forecasting more accurately as such disclosures 
improve the information environment (Bhat et al., 2006). Corporate governance disclosures 
provide financial analysts with essential information about the firms’ organizations and 
governance. Such information enables the analysts’ to assess the reliability of the financial 
statements (Yu, 2010).  
Similarly, corporate governance disclosures are associated with better forecasts accuracy 
as the financial analysts will have supplemental information regarding the corporate governance 
policies and risks related that are essential for predicting future profitability (Durnev & Kim, 
2005; Klapper & Love, 2004). Corporate governance disclosures have a major incremental value 
over financial information for the financial analysts in predicting future earnings (Vanstraelen et 
al., 2003). Since audit committee voluntary disclosures are mainly corporate governance 
disclosures, we come with the following hypothesis: 
H4: The forecast error is negatively related to the extent of voluntary disclosures in the 
audit committee report  
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4.3.2.3 Financial Analyst Forecast Dispersion and Voluntary Disclosures in the Audit 
Committee Report 
 In our prior hypothesis, we suggest that audit committee voluntary disclosures reduces 
analysts’ forecast error. As the forecast error will decrease, analysts forecast dispersion will 
decrease. The prior literature suggests that there is a negative association between voluntary 
disclosures and financial analyst forecast dispersion (Hope, 2003; Orens & Lybaert, 2013; 
Vanstraelen et al., 2003; Yu, 2010). This is due to the enrichment of the information 
environment that decreases information asymmetry and uncertainty and improves future earnings 
predictability; thus, the financial analysts will have less errors in their forecasts and less 
dispersion (Orens & Lybaert, 2013). Thus, we come with our last hypothesise: 
 H5: The forecast dispersion is negatively related to the extent of voluntary disclosures in 
the audit committee report 
4.4 Research Design 
4.4.1 Data: Sample and Coding of Voluntary Disclosure in Audit Committee Report 
This study examines the voluntary disclosures in the audit committee report of the top 
listed US bank holding companies in 2005 by coding the voluntary disclosures in the audit 
committee report. The year 2005 is selected as the benchmark year as it falls three years after the 
implementation of SOX which greatly impacted audit committees’ composition, duties, and 
activities, and three years before the financial crisis in 2008. As suggested by Botosan (1997) 
and Healy (1985), disclosures do not change greatly over time and seem constant from year to 
year. In the study of Botosan (1997) the sample was limited to one year for one industry only as 
disclosures are sticky from year to year and selecting different industries would reveal different 
disclosure practices. Similarly, coding of the voluntary disclosures in the audit committee report 
is not performed for each consecutive year starting in 2005 as it would not have changed greatly 
from year to year. However, since the industry, corporate governance organizations, and the SEC 
discuss enhancements in the audit committee reports, the study focuses on the reports for the 
years 2005, 2008, 2011, and 2014. This allows for observing changes in voluntary disclosures in 
the audit committee reports every three years for a total period of ten years extending from 2005 
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to 2014. The disclosure coding scores over the years confirm the notion that disclosures do not 
vary considerably from year to year.  
Prior banking research which involves manual coding of corporate disclosures, such as 
Jizi, Salama, Dixon, & Stratling (2014); Jizi & Dixon (2017); Jizi & Nehme (2018), set a 
minimum threshold on banks’ total assets to be included in the study sample. This selection 
criteria ensures that the sample is coherent, and the banks have in common the same regulations 
and similar interest by investors. Likewise, we select the top public traded bank holding 
companies which had a minimum of $2 billions in total assets in 2005. The final sample consists 
of 103 banks whose total assets ranged from $2 billion to $1.5 trillion in 2005.  
Together these 103 banks hold a high percentage of total assets within the total banking 
industry (public and private banks) in the US: 56%, 83%, 72%, and 74% respectively for 2005, 
2008, 2011, and 2014. In light of the sample banks’ size and presence within financial markets, it 
is expected that investors would be very interested in any type of information which can shed 
light on banks’ financial reporting, such as the audit committee report. Moreover, considering the 
complexity of these banks’ activities, we can infer that audit committees’ play a critical role in 
ensuring high-quality financial reporting.   
A disclosure grid is developed to measure the level of voluntary disclosures in the audit 
committee reports. The grid is based on recommendations from ten industry and governance 
organizations that have analyzed audit committee disclosures and provided recommendations 
since 201221. The disclosure scoring grid includes the following categories: 1) Internal controls 
and risk oversight, 2) Financial reporting oversight, 3) External auditor oversight, and 4) Internal 
auditor oversight. Appendix A presents the disclosure scoring grid that is used in this study. In 
order to assess the validity and consistency of scores generated by the disclosure grid, a sample 
of twenty audit committee reports were chosen randomly and were given to two independent 
coders. The two coders got the instructions on how to use the scoring grid and the scoring 
                                                 
21 US reports: Enhancing the Audit Committee Report: A call to Action (Audit Committee Collaboration, 2012), 
Audit committee bulletin (EY Building a better working world, 2013), Enhancing communication among investors, 
auditors, and audit committees (Tapestry Networks, 2014), A new era in audit committee reporting (Deloitte Audit 
Committee Brief, 2014) 2014), Audit committee transparency barometer (Center for Audit Quality, 2015), 
Enhancing audit quality transparency (EY Building a better working world, 2015), EY Center for Board Matters 
(EY Center for Board Matters, 2016). UK reports: Enhancing the value of the audit committee (ACCA, 2014), 
Enhancing confidence in audits (Financial Reporting Council, 2015). Global report: Audit Committee Reports: 




method. The results of the two coders were compared to ensure that the grid is not leading to 
different scores by different coders. The results led to minor modifications in the grid so that 
coding leads to similar scores.     
Textual analysis of disclosures can be either performed by human or computer-aided 
(Beattie, McInnes, & Fearnley, 2004). Human coding presents several advantages since it can be 
customized for the specific study conducted. It can be more precise and focused toward the 
research design. However, it presents several disadvantages as it is very time consuming, 
expensive, and not easy to replicate. Computer-aided programs offer the advantage of being 
efficient and fast in coding and also more reliable since they are based on a rule-based approach 
(Melloni, Caglio, & Perego, 2017). For the purpose of this study, the coding is done manually as 
the aim is to look for the voluntary disclosures in the audit committee report and code based on 
its contextual informativeness and richness. The content of the voluntary disclosures in audit 
committee reports was analyzed in detail considering not only the audit committee stating that 
the activity was performed during the year but the extent of details provided about what and how 
the audit committee performed its activities. In our coding, we do not give consideration to the 
length of the text; we are mainly interested in the informativeness and richness of the voluntary 
disclosures. Our coding capture the voluntary disclosures that shareholders and corporate 
governance organizations considered useful and informative to the investors. Accordingly, a 
score was assigned to each statement in the grid using a scaling from zero to three depending on 
the informativeness and in-depth of the voluntary disclosures. The below extract provides an 
example of how scores were assigned depending on the depth of information provided by the 
voluntary disclosures.    
Extracts from the audit committee reports of disclosures related to the external auditor 
evaluation process 
 
Comerica Incorporated, 2015 proxy statement, score=1 
The Audit Committee oversees the independent auditors’ qualifications and independence and 
the performance of the independent auditors.  
 
Bank of America Corporation, score=2  
The Company annually evaluates PWC’s qualifications, performance and independence. The 
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Committee also has discussed and confirmed with PWC its independence from our company. 
The committee has evaluated and concluded that the non-audit services provided by PWC to our 
company do not impair PWC’s independence. 
 
JPMorgan Chase & Co, 2015 proxy statement, score=3  
In conducting our review we considered, among other things: 
1) PWC’s historical and recent performance on the Firm’s audit, including the extent and 
quality of PWC’s communications with the Audit Committee 
2) An analysis of PWC known legal risks and significant proceedings 
3) Data relating to audit quality and performance, including recent PCAOB reports on PWC 
and its global network of firms 
4) The appropriateness of PWC fees, both on an absolute basis and as compared with its 
peer firms 
5) PWC’s tenure as the Firm’s independent auditor and its depth  of understanding of the 
Firm’s global businesses 
6) PWC capability and expertise in handling the breadth and complexity of the Firm’s 
worldwide operations, including the expertise and capability of PWC’s lead audit partner 
for the Firm  
 
4.4.2 Empirical Models 
4.4.2.1 Estimation of Discretionary Loan Loss Provision and Main Model Test 
We empirically examine the relationship between discretionary loan loss provision that 
measures banks’ earnings management and the extent of voluntary disclosure in the audit 
committee reports. This necessitates the use of a two-step approach. First, the non-discretionary 
loan loss provision is estimated using the model of Kanagaretnam et al., (2010). We regress LLP 
on beginning loan loss allowance, beginning non-performing loans, change in non-performing 




𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐵𝐸𝐺𝐿𝐿𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝛽2𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝐶𝐻𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐻𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡 
+ 𝛽8𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐴𝐺𝑅𝐼𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽10𝐹𝐵𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐷𝐸𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖,𝑡 
+   𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀 
Where: 
LLP: loan loss provision as a percentage of beginning total loans 
BEGLLA: Beginning loan loss allowance as a percentage of beginning total loans 
BEGNPL: Beginning non-performing loans as a percentage of beginning total loans 
CHNPL: Change in non-performing loans as a percentage of beginning total loans 
LCO: Net loan charge-offs as a percentage of beginning total loans 
CHLOANS: Change in loans as a percentage of beginning total loans 
LOANS: Total Loans as a percentage of beginning total loans 
COMM: Commercial loans as a percentage of beginning total loans 
CON: Consumer loans as a percentage of beginning total loans 
RESTATE: Real estate loans as a percentage of beginning total loans 
AGRI: Agriculture loans as a percentage of beginning total loans 
FBG: Loans to foreign banks and governments as a percentage of beginning total loans 
DEPINS: Loans to depositry institutions as a percentage of beginning total loans 
ε: error term 
 
The discretionary component of loan loss provision is the ε (error term) which will be called 
DLLP. The DLLP will be measuring the earnings management of the banks.   
Main model: DLLP and Audit Committee Voluntary Disclosures 
 As the objective of the study is to test whether there is an association between voluntary 
disclosure in the audit committee report and discretionary accruals (earnings management), the 
second step regression will estimate the following model: 
 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑖𝑔4𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +
+𝛽5𝑀𝑡𝑜𝐵𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽6𝐿𝑛𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟1𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟1𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 +
 𝛽9𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟1𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐴𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐴𝐶𝑀𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽13𝐴𝐶𝐹𝐸%𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽14𝐴𝐶𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽15𝐴𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽16𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +
 𝛽17𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽18𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒% + 𝛽19𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝%𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽20𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 +
𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑏𝑦 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 + ε 
 
The dependent variable is the score of the voluntary disclosures in the audit committee report. As 
for the independent variable of interest, it is the DLLP that is a proxy of the earnings quality of 
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the bank. A negative DLLP signifies management uses loan loss provision to increase earnings, 
while a positive DLLP signifies management uses loan loss provision to decrease earnings. 
Following prior research in banking that considered DLLP as a main variable, we run the 
regression separately for 1) absolute DLLP,  2) negative (income-increasing) DLLP and 3) 
positive (income-decreasing) DLLP (DeBoskey & Jiang, 2012; Kanagaretnam et al., 2010). The 
absolute DLLP will allow to analyze the extent of aggressiveness by the bank managers in 
increasing or decreasing the earnings of the banks at their discretion. Similarly, we have a 
specific interest with the negative DLLP since it has an increasing effect on reported earnings 
revealing aggressive accounting practices that were not curbed by audit committees. 
A positive relation between absolute DLLP and voluntary disclosure score signifies that 
voluntary disclosures increases whenever audit committees are not curbing bank managers 
discretion in either increasing or decreasing the bank earnings. A negative relation between 
negative DLLP and voluntary disclosure score signifies that voluntary disclosure increases when 
the audit committee is not able to curb the aggressive use of loan loss provision by managers. 
This implies that the voluntary disclosure is impression management exercised by the audit 
committees. On the other hand, a positive relation between negative DLLP and disclosure score 
signifies the existence of aggressive financial reporting practices; however, the audit committee 
is not engaged in providing additional voluntary disclosure. 
The following are the variables definition:  
Voluntary disclosure: Score of the Voluntary Disclosure in the audit committee report 
DLLP: Discretionary loan loss provision (residual in the first regression) 
Big4: Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the bank is audited by a Big4, 0 otherwise  
EBTP: Earnings before taxes and provision divided by total loans at the beginning of the year 
Loss: Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the bank has a negative EBTP, 0 otherwise 
LnAssets: Natural log of total assets 
MtoB: Market to book ratio 
Inst: Number of institutional investors that hold over 5% of the bank’s shares 
Tier1CommRatio: Tier 1 common share capital ratio 
Tier1RiskRatio: Tier 1 risk-adjusted capital ratio 
Defensive: Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the audit committee report includes defensive 
language, 0 otherwise 
MDAPages: Number of MD&A pages 
ACSize: Number of audit committee members 
ACMeeting: Number of meetings held by the audit committee 
ACFE%: Number of audit committee financial experts divided by total number of audit 
committee members 
ACFemale: Number of female directors on the audit committee 
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ACChairFemale: Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the chair of audit committee is female, 0 
otherwise  
BoardSize: Number of board members 
BoardFemale%: Number of female directors on the board divided by total number of board 
members 
BoardIndep%: Number of independent board members divided by total number of board 
members 
CEODuality: Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the chair of the board is also CEO, 0 otherwise  
 
 
In our model, we control for several factors similar to prior voluntary disclosure studies. 
We control for the audit quality whether the auditor is a Big4 or not. Previous studies discuss the 
superior audit quality of the Big4 when compared to non-Big4 (Eshleman & Guo, 2014; 
Reynolds & Francis, 2000). The audit quality can be considered a substitute for the audit 
committee oversight. Thus, a bank with high audit quality may have its audit committee less 
involved in financial reporting oversight or disclose less voluntary disclosures in their audit 
committee reports to shareholders. Also, we control for banks’ performance and banks’ distress 
as firms reporting low performance or negative earnings may necessitate additional monitoring 
by the audit committees which can affect the level of the voluntary disclosures. We control for 
size as Carcello et al., (2002) suggest that larger firms tend to disclose more voluntary 
disclosures. Another control measure we consider is the bank growth that is measured by the 
market-to-book. This measure is mainly used in the finance literature and banking studies 
(Cornett et al., 2009). The level of institutional investors can also impact the disclosures in the 
audit committee report. Prior literature discusses that firms with more institutional investors tend 
to provide less disclosures related to compensation practices (Laksmana, 2008). We predict that 
the higher the institutional investors, the lower the voluntary disclosures in the audit committee 
report. As the study is related to bank holding companies, we control for Tier 1 capital ratio and 
Tier 1 risk ratio similar to prior studies (Cornett et al., 2009; DeBoskey & Jiang, 2012; 
Kanagaretnam et al., 2010) . Some audit committee reports included a defensive language that 
informed the reader about the limited responsibility of the audit committee members and that 
their report does not constitute soliciting material to be filed or incorporated into any other 
company filing. We control for firms that used such a defensive language by having a dummy 
variable. Moreover, we control for the MD&A number of pages as disclosing voluntary 
disclosures can be firm specific.   
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In addition, we control for several audit committee characteristics that may affect the 
voluntary disclosures level in the audit committee report. Audit committee size can impact the 
level of the financial reporting process oversight (Abbott, Parker, & Peters, 2004). Similarly, we 
control for the audit committee financial experts who serve on the audit committee. Carcello et 
al., (2011) find a positive relation between the number of financial experts on the audit 
committee and financial reporting quality; thus, it is expected that the higher the number of 
financial experts will lead to more voluntary disclosures. Prior research reveal that female 
directors provide better financial reporting oversight (Aldamen, Hollindale, & Ziegelmayer, 
2018; Lai, Srinidhi, Gul, & Tsui, 2017; Srinidhi, Gul, & Tsui, 2011). Having more female 
directors on the audit committee is expected to increase the level of financial reporting quality 
and voluntary disclosures in the audit committee report. Similarly, other studies analyzed the role 
of females as chairs of audit committees. Thus, we control for the number of female members on 
the audit committees and whether the chair of the audit committee is a female director. We also 
control for audit committee meetings frequency. 
In addition to the audit committee characteristics control, we control for boards 
characteristics. We control for board size as the number of board members is an important factor 
in enhancing corporate transparency. Also, we control for the gender diversity, percentage of 
female directors on board, as prior studies suggest that female directors on board can affect the 
level of disclosures. A higher percentage of female directors on the board change the 
composition of boards which in turn affect the internal dynamics and functioning of the board 
(Nielsen & Huse, 2010). We control for board independence as prior studies suggest independent 
directors on the board have higher incentives to disclose voluntary disclosures (Fama & Jensen, 
1983; Patelli & Prencipe, 2007). Finally, we control for CEO Duality that is considered a 
weakness in corporate governance (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
 
4.4.2.2 Estimation of Ex-Ante Cost of Equity Capital and Main Test Model 
Similar to previous studies, we will use the following three models in order to estimate 
the ex ante cost of equity capital: 1) Easton (2004) model (RPEG), 2) modified Easton (2004) 
model (RMPEG), 3) Ohlson & Juettner-Nauroth (2005) model (ROJN). As a fourth measure of ex 
ante cost of equity capital (RAVER), we will use the average of these three models. We estimate 
the different models as follows: 
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𝑒𝑝𝑠𝑡+2 + 𝑅𝑀𝑃𝐸𝐺𝑑𝑝𝑠0 − 𝑒𝑝𝑠𝑡+1
𝑅𝑀𝑃𝐸𝐺
2 ) 
𝑅𝑂𝐽𝑁 = 𝑎 + √𝑎2 + (
𝑒𝑝𝑠𝑡+1
𝑃𝑡
) (𝑔2 − (𝑟𝑓 − 0.03)) 
Where: 
Eps t+1 =  financial analysts earnings per share mean forecast in one year ahead 
Eps t+2 =  financial analysts earnings per share mean forecast in two year ahead 
Pt =  price per share of common stock 
Rf= risk-free rate 
Dpso=dividend per share paid during year t-1 
 











We regress a measure of implied cost of equity capital on voluntary disclosures, and a set 
of control variables that are usually used in the cost of equity capital literature: size, leverage, 
book-to-market, CEO duality. Also, we include the Tier 1 Comm ratio since the study is related 
to bank holding companies.  
𝑅(𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦)𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑀𝑡𝑜𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑛𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟1 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽9𝐿𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙  
 
Where: 
Voluntary Disclosure = Score of the voluntary disclosure in the audit committee report 
Size = Natural logarithm of total assets 
Leverage= Total Liabilities divided by total assets 
ROE = Net income divided by total equity 
MtoB = market value of equity divided by book value of equity 
InvPrice = Inverse of stock price 
Ln Tier 1 Comm ratio = natural logarithm of Tier 1 common ratio 
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CEO Duality = dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is also Chairman of the board; otherwise 0 
LnDispersion = Natural logarithm of analysts forecast dispersion   
Negative Earnings = Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the bank has negative net income, 0 
otherwise 
  
 The main coefficient of interest is 𝛽1. A positive coefficient signifies an increase in cost 
of equity capital when voluntary disclosures increases. Regarding the control variables, size is 
included as prior literature suggests that whenever firms size increase, the cost of capital 
decreases ((Fama & French, 1992; Fama & French, 1993; Hail & Leuz, 2006). The investors 
perceive a higher risk for firms in high growth stages. Thus, the Market-to-Book is included 
similar to prior research  (Fama & French, 1992; Fama & French, 1993; Gebhardt, Lee, & 
Swaminathan, 2001; Hail & Leuz, 2006). High leverage is expected to increase cost of capital 
(Fama & French, 1992; Fama & French, 1993; Modigliani & Miller, 1958). Analyst forecast 
dispersion is included as a control variable. Gebhardt et al., (2001) and Dhaliwal, Li, & Moser 
(2005) suggest that there is a positive association between analyst forecast dispersion and the 
implied cost of equity capital.   
4.4.2.3 Financial Analysts Forecasting Properties and Voluntary Disclosures 
 We analyze the financial analysts’ forecasting properties and voluntary disclosures in the 
audit committee report by considering the financial analysts’ forecast accuracy, and financial 
analysts’ forecast dispersion. In order to determine the effect of the voluntary disclosures in the 
audit committee report on the financial analysts’ behavior, we run the following two regressions 
(Ali, Chen, & Radhakrishnan, 2007; Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Lang & Lundholm, 1996): 
 
 𝐿𝑛𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑛𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽6𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 +
 𝛽8𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟1𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽9𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽11𝐴𝐶 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +
 𝛽12𝐴𝐶𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 
 
𝐿𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑛𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽6𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 +
 𝛽8𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟1𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽9𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽11𝐴𝐶 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +




Forecast error measures the absolute value of financial analysts’ average error over a period of 
12 months. Dispersion is the average standard error deviation of financial analyst divided by the 
stock price at the beginning of the period.  
 The models includes several control variables that were identified from prior literature. 
We control for the following factors: 1) Firms with high leverage are generally characterized in 
having higher fluctuation in earnings. It is expected to have a positive relationship with forecast 
error and dispersion (Hope, 2003). 2) Size as there is a negative relationship between size and 
forecast error (Hope, 2003; Lang & Lundholm, 1996; Lang, Lins, & Miller, 2004; Leuz, 2003). 
3) Financial analysts are more likely to follow firms with higher ROE since it allows higher 
trading benefits (Bhushan, 1989); thus we include ROE as a control measure. 4) As for 
considering the strength of the bank, we include the Tier 1 Risk ratio (Magnan, Menini, & 
Parbonetti, 2015). 5) Financial analysts have difficulties in forecasting future earnings of firms 
that are making losses. Thus, a loss indicator is expected to be positively related to analysts 
forecast error and forecast dispersion (Hope, 2003). 6) Since our study is related to governance 
disclosure, we include several corporate governance measures related to board and audit 
committees, such as institutional investors, board size, CEO duality, audit committee size, and 
audit committee financial experts.   
4.5 Empirical Results 
4.5.1 Descriptive Statistics of Voluntary Disclosures Score 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of voluntary disclosures in the audit committee 
reports as measured based on the disclosure scoring grid. The total average of disclosures by year 
show that the voluntary disclosures did not increase significantly between 2005 and 2014. The 
average score increased from 3.94 in 2005 to 4.55 in 2014. The increase in the voluntary 
disclosures is very minimal over the period of 10 years. These scores confirm the investors’ 
requests for more information about the audit committees’ activities, and contradict the view that 
voluntary disclosures in audit committee reports increased significantly. 
The scoring grid categorizes the voluntary disclosures into four categories. The highest 
category all over the years is category 3: External auditor oversight. The average score of the 
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voluntary disclosures related to external auditor oversight (category 3) increased from 2.34 to 
2.79 from 2005 to 2014. In general, audit committee reports discussed more about their 
assessment of the external auditor independence and qualifications, and some reports started to 
mention the tenure of the external auditor. The second highest category of voluntary disclosures 
is category 1: Internal controls and risk management oversight. Overall, the average voluntary 
disclosures in this category increased from 0.76 in 2005 to 0.89 in 2014. The increase started 
during the crisis period and continued until 2014. The reason for the increase is that more banks’ 
audit committees are disclosing information about their assessment of the internal controls 
process and the risk management process. The third highest category of voluntary disclosure is 
category 4: Internal auditor oversight. This category decreased during the crisis period and as of 
2014 report did not reach its initial level. Its mean decreased from 0.83 in 2005 to 0.80 in 2014. 
The lowest category average is category 2: Financial reporting oversight. Considering that the 
sample comprises bank holding companies, it is surprising that audit committees are not 
disclosing information about their activities with respect to financial reporting oversight. Such 
activities can include valuation of assets and liabilities, examination of the loan loss provision, 
and review of the bank annual budget. In fact, audit committees disclosed minimal information 
about those activities that are critical for the financial reporting quality of banks. Considering the 
banks’ complex business environment and opaqueness of its assets and liabilities valuation, audit 
committees are expected to engage in active oversight  in this area. However, from 2005 to 2014, 
the average disclosure score for this category increased minimally from 0.04 to 0.06. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
4.5.2 Voluntary Disclosures in Audit Committee Report and Earnings Management 
4.5.2.1 Descriptive Statistics of First Regression to Estimate DLLP 
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics for the study’s main variables and the related 
control variables. The mean LLPSc is 0.7% and median LLPSc is 0.36%. In other words, the 
LLP absolute value is $294.7 million since beginning total loans (deflator) mean is $42.1 billion. 
Hence, the loan loss provision is a large account. This is evident as the study analyzes the big 
bank holding companies. The mean of DLLP is -0.0000 which is by construction as the model is 
estimating the discretionary component of loan loss provision. 76% of the sample banks are 
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audited by Big 4 audit firms. It is a high percentage since these banks are large ones. Mean bank 
size, as per assets, is $95.7 Billion (natural log of total assets: 23.26). As for the loan categories, 
the descriptive statistics show that the real estate loans compose 73% of the total loans. As for 
the negative earnings before taxes and provisions, 3.8% of sample observations report a negative 
earnings before taxes and provisions. The deflated Earnings before taxes and provision (EBTP) 
mean is 0.0285, which is equivalent to $1.2 Billion (0.0285 x $42.1B). The market-to-book ratio 
mean is 1.2 that is relatively low as large banks have a lower growth rates than smaller banks and 
the period covered affected banks growth. The Tier1Capial ratio mean is 10.35 showing that the 
banks in the sample are well capitalized above the regulatory requirement of 5%. As for the 
banks on the sample that used defensive language in their audit committee report, they represent 
8% of the total sample.   
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Correlations are presented in table 5 and table 6. Table 5 represents the correlation of the 
scaled variables for the first regression that estimates the DLLP. As per the model expectation 
there is a positive correlation between LLP and beginning non-performing loans (BegNPL), 
change in non-performing loans (CHNPL), and loan charge-off (LCO). LLP is negatively 
correlated to total change in loans (CHLOANS). Table 6 represents the correlations for the 
variables of the second step regression. For the other variables, while there are correlations with 
some significance, none warrants any concern. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 5 AND 6 ABOUT HERE] 
  
4.5.2.2 Estimation of Abnormal LLP (DLLP) 
The estimation of abnormal LLP (DLLP) results of the first regression is in table 7. The 
results show that the coefficient signs of the main independent variables are as expected in the 
model of Kanagaretnam et al., (2010). The coefficient of Beginning loan loss allowance 
(BEGLLA), Beginning non-performing loans (BEGNPL), change in non-performing loans 
(CHNPL), and loan charge-off (LCO) are all significant at the 1% level. As for the loan 
categories, commercial loans are significant at the 1% level and agriculture loans significant at 
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the 10% level. The adjusted R2 is 91.23% meaning that the model explains well the variations in 
the LLP. The residuals of this model are used as the discretionary component of loan loss 
provision (DLLP). 
 
[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
 
4.5.2.3 Multivariate Analysis: Voluntary Disclosures and Earnings Management 
For analyzing the association between the voluntary disclosure in audit committee reports 
and banks’ earnings management, the study follows Kanagaretnam et al. (2010) and DeBoskey 
and Jiang (2012) method in partitioning the bank years’ data. First, we consider only the 
observations with a negative sign of DLLP that means income-increasing practices by the bank 
managers. Second, we consider only the observations with a positive sign of DLLP that means 
income-decreasing practices by the bank managers. Third, we consider all the observations in 
our sample by taking the absolute DLLP values. This allows us to study at the same time the 
aggressiveness of bank managers in increasing or decreasing the net income based on their 
discretion. Three regressions are run separately for each category in order to analyze the effect of 
banks’ earnings management on the voluntary disclosures in the audit committee report. 
 Table 8 presents the results for negative DLLP (income-increasing). Since we are 
considering the negative DLLP (negative number), a negative coefficient signifies a positive 
relationship between the negative DLLP and voluntary disclosure score. The negative DLLP 
coefficient (-189.39, p-value<0.01) suggests that there is a positive relationship between 
voluntary disclosure score and negative DLLP. This means that the audit committee that is not 
constraining aggressive reporting is engaged in more voluntary disclosures about its activities 
that are supposed to enhance financial reporting quality. The result are consistent with 
hypotheses 1 and 2 that audit committees engage in impression management. For the control 
variables, the results suggest that voluntary disclosure decreases whenever the auditor is a Big4 
firm (-2.21, p-value<0.10). The coefficient suggests that audit committees are disclosing more 
disclosures when the auditor is not a Big4 just to impress further the reader about the audit 
committee performance. The coefficient for Defensive language is 4.93 (p-value<0.05). It 
implies that when the financial reporting quality is low, audit committees use defensive language 
in their report to limit their responsibility. On average, they increase the extent of voluntary 
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disclosure score by 4.93. As for the control variables related to governance, two variables have 
significant coefficients. Board independence percentage coefficient (9.22, p-value<0.01) suggest 
that voluntary disclosures increase when board independence increases. This is in line with our 
expectations since higher independence level in the board will increase voluntary disclosures. As 
for the CEO Duality coefficient (-1.38, p-value<0.05), it implies that the CEO holding both 
positions decreases the level of voluntary disclosures in the audit committee report. The CEO 
duality is considered a governance weakness that is usually associated with less voluntary 
disclosures. The adjusted R2 is 20.49% signifies the model explains well the variations in DLLP. 
The main independent variable, DLLP Negative, coefficient is very high; however, the mean is 
very small. Its economic significance is 100%, meaning that when the managers engage in 
income increasing by one standard deviation, the audit committee voluntary disclosure score 
increases by 100%.   
[INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 9 presents the results of the regression with positive DLLP (income-decreasing) as 
the dependent variable. The coefficient of DLLP Positive is 68.30; however, it is not significant. 
The coefficient of Loss (2.93, p-value<0.05) suggests that when the banks’ managers are 
conservative in their accounting practices the audit committees disclose more voluntary 
information in their reports to compensate for the negative earnings. As the financial reporting 
quality is more conservative, the audit committees are safer to disclose more voluntary 
disclosures to compensate for the loss. The coefficient of the defensive language (3.92, p-
value<0.05) means that the audit committees disclose more voluntary disclosures when they use 
protective language that may minimize their liability exposure. The board size coefficient (0.17, 
p-value<0.01) which signifies that the bigger the board size the higher the voluntary disclosure in 
the audit committee report. As expected, the bigger the board size the higher the voluntary 
disclosures; however, the coefficient is also minimal. For every additional director on the board, 
the voluntary score will increase by 0.16. Finally, the coefficient of the institutional investors (-
0.47, p-value<0.05) shows that having more institutional investors with at least 5% ownership 
decreases the voluntary disclosures in the audit committee report. Even though the institutional 
investors in their comment letters (chapter 3) are urging audit committees to disclose more 
voluntary disclosures, the practice shows that the higher the number of institutional investors 
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who own more than 5% of the company, the less the voluntary disclosures score by 0.47. The 
adjusted R2 is 13.33% signifies the model explains well the variations in DLLP. The main 
independent variable, DLLP Positive, coefficient is very high; however, the mean is very small. 
Its economic significance is 126%, meaning that when the managers engage in decreasing 
earnings by one standard deviation, the audit committee voluntary disclosure score increases by 
126%. 
[INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE] 
  
Finally, we run the third regression that takes all the observations in our sample by 
considering the absolute DLLP. The absolute DLLP is a measure that considers banks’ managers 
discretion in either increasing or decreasing net income.. Either excessive aggressiveness in 
increasing net income or excessive conservativism in decreasing net income based on managers’ 
discretion is a weakness of audit committees who are not able to curb managers’ discretion. 
Thus, the absolute DLLP is an important measure to consider in our study. The regression results 
are presented in table 10. The coefficient of absolute DLLP (106.79, p-value<0.01) suggests that 
when the banks managers’ discretion to increase or decrease net income is higher, audit 
committees increase the level of voluntary disclosure in their audit committee report. It 
reconfirms the prior results when the regressions were run for DLLP Negative and DLLP 
Positive. As the audit committees are not able to reduce the discretion of bank managers, they 
tend to increase the voluntary disclosures as a way of compensating for the weakness in the 
financial reporting quality. The coefficient of Big4 (-1.82, p-value<0.01) signifies that the audit 
committees tend to compensate for the absence of a Big4 audit firm by increasing the voluntary 
disclosures in their audit committee report. The defensive language coefficient (4.78, p-
value<0.01) signifies that audit committees increase the voluntary disclosures in their audit 
committee reports after using defensive language that may protects them in case there is an issue. 
The coefficient of institutional investors (-0.31, p-value<0.01) suggests that whenever the bank 
has an additional institutional investor who own more than 5% of the shares, the voluntary 
disclosures score is reduced by 0.31. Even though institutional investors’, in their comment 
letters to the SEC, are arguing for an increase in voluntary disclosure in the audit committee 
report, the results shows that the effect of such investors on actual disclosure practices is the 
opposite. The adjusted R2 is 17.81% signifies the model explains well the variations in DLLP. 
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The main independent variable, absolute DLLP, coefficient is very high; however, the mean is 
very small. Its economic significance is 112%, meaning that when the managers engage in 
earnings management by one standard deviation, the audit committee voluntary disclosure score 
increases by 112%.     
 
[INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE] 
4.5.2.4 Additional Analyses 
In our sample, around 8% of the audit committee reports include “defensive language” 
disclosure that attempt to limit the audit committee members’ responsibility. The disclosure 
mainly informs the readers that the report does not constitute soliciting material to be filed or 
incorporated into any other company filing. It is interesting that those audit committee reports 
limit the responsibility of its members whose main responsibility is to oversee the financial 
reporting process. We perform an additional test (logit regression) which considers the 
“defensive language” variable as the dependent variable. Our aim is to understand the 
determinants of the audit committees that use defensive language in their report. Table 11 
presents the results of our analysis. The results suggest that audit committees that disclose more 
voluntary disclosures in their audit committee report tend to protect themselves with defensive 
language. Also, firms audited by Big4 firms have their audit committees use a defensive 
language. It may suggests that the audit committees rely more on the Big 4 audit firm 
performance and attempt to reduce their exposure. For firms with higher Market-to-Book, there 
is a positive association with the defensive language. Audit committees may be concerned about 
the additional risk that high growth can expose to the banks. Similarly, there is a positive 
association between the defensive language and bank size. This can be caused by the difficulty 
that the audit committees can face in overseeing big banks. Thus, they use defensive language to 
limit their exposure. As for the audit committees characteristics, the test suggests that the less the 
audit committee financial experts (ACFE) in the audit committee, the more the probability of 
using defensive language. As audit committee members will feel not well staffed with experts on 
board, they tend to protect themselves. Finally, the results suggest that there is a negative 
association between board independence and defensive language. It signifies that the audit 
committees may feel the corporate governance are weakened with less independent directors, 




[INSERT TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE] 
  
In addition to the model of Kanagaretnam et al., (2010), the study employs Bushman and 
Williams’ (2012) model to ensure that results are not model-specific. The results of the second 
step regression are similar to those found when using Kanagaretnam et al., (2010) and main 
coefficients significant at the level of 5% and 10% with the similar signs. This implies that the 
results were not driven by the model selection. The results are presented in tables 12, 13, and 14. 
 
[INSERT TABLES 12, 13, 14 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Furthermore, we conduct a robustness test to verify our results. In order to ensure that our 
manual coding is not affecting the results, a variable is created that segregates the voluntary 
disclosures score into low level (below the average of 4) and high level (above the average of 4). 
The regression coefficient signs of the main variables remain the same and are significant at the 
level of 5% and 10%. The results are presented in tables 15, 16, and 17. 
 
[INSERT TABLES 15, 16, 17 ABOUT HERE] 
 
4.5.3 Voluntary Disclosures in the Audit Committee Report and Cost of Equity   
4.5.3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 18 presents the statistics of the regression variables related to cost of equity association 
with audit committee voluntary disclosures. The average ex-ante cost of equity (Raver) show a 
mean (0.17) and a median (0.097) and a standard deviation (0.309). The ex-ante cost of equity 
measures the investors perception of risk. The study period extends over the financial crisis 
2008-2009 that had a great impact on US banks. Thus, it is expected to perceive such high 
variation by the investors required rate of return on their investments. The natural log of total 
assets shows that the bank holding companies in the sample are large in size. The sample mean is 
23.26 (total assets $95 Billions), median is 22.78 (total assets $7.8 Billions), and the standard 
deviation is 1.59 (total assets $347 Millions). The big variation is mainly related to the top four 
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bank holding companies (Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase, Citigroup, and Wells Fargo). All 
the other banks in the sample are very similar in size. The return on equity (ROE) mean is 0.06 
and median is 0.08 and standard deviation is 0.16. There is a variation in ROE as the study 
sample covers crisis period and the recovery phase. The market-to-book has a mean of 1.21 and a 
median of 1.16 showing that banks have been growing. As for banks incurring losses (negative 
net income), the sample comprises on average 9% of the observations incurring losses.   
 
[INSERT TABLE 18 ABOUT HERE] 
     
 Table 19 presents the correlations of the variables. Voluntary disclosures in the audit 
committee report and cost of equity are positively correlated, as expected in our hypothesis. 
However, the coefficient correlation is not statistically significant at conventional levels. As for 
the control variables, the correlation between leverage and cost of equity are positively related 
and significant at the 5% level. LnDispersion is positively correlated to cost of equity and 
significant at 1% level. This positive relationship is expected in our hypothesis since higher 
dispersion in forecast by financial analysts increases the implied cost of equity. Finally, the 
correlation between  losses and implied cost of equity is positive and significant at 1% level. 
This means that investors perceive higher risk by firms' with losses' thus, they require a higher 
return on their investments.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 19 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 In addition to the correlation among the variables of the regression, table 20 presents the 
pair of correlation among the different measures used in calculating Raver: Rpeg (Easton, 2004) 
Rojn (Ohlson & Juettner-Nauroth, 2005), Rmpeg (modified Easton, 2004). All these variables are 
positively highly correlated, above 0.928, at a 1% significance. Thus, the Raver is a good proxy 
for all the three implied cost of equity measures.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 20 ABOUT HERE] 
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4.5.3.2 Multivariate Analysis 
In the multivariate analysis, we regress the cost of equity (4 different measures) on the score of 
the voluntary disclosures in the audit committee report and control variables. We control for 
different firm characteristics that are related to cost of equity similar to prior literature: leverage, 
size, return-on-equity, market-to-book, inverse price, CEO duality, reporting losses, and analyst 
forecast dispersion. Also, we control for Tier 1 Common ratio capital which is a control used in 
the prior literature for bank holding companies. Table 21 provides the regression results using 
four measures of cost of equity: Rpeg, Rojn, Rmpeg, and Raver. The four regressions show that there 
is a positive relationship between cost of equity and voluntary disclosures score.  The 
coefficients of the four regressions  are as follows: Rpeg (0.00316, p-value<0.05), Rojn  (0.00907, 
p-value<0.05), Rmpeg (0.00906, p-value<0.05), and Raver  (0.00708, p-value<0.05). The 
coefficients suggest that for every 1 (one) unit increase in voluntary disclosures score, the cost of 
equity increases by 0.3%, 0.9%, 0.9%, and 0.7% respectively. The adjusted R square for the four 
regressions is between 51.9% and 66.1%.  
 As for the control variables, the coefficient of the leverage variable is positively related to 
the cost of equity and is significant at the 5% level. The positive relationship is expected since 
banks with higher leverage presents higher risks for investors who will require a higher rate of 
return. Inverse price coefficient is positively related to cost of equity and significant at 1% level. 
The CEO duality is positively related to the cost of equity as holding these two positions by the 
same person is considered a weakness in governance. As for the coefficient of Tier 1 Common 
ratio, it is negative and significant at 5% level. This signifies that the better the bank is 
capitalized, the lower the cost of equity required by investors. The coefficient of the analyst 
forecast dispersion (natural log of dispersion) is positive as the more difficult for analyst to 
forecast future earnings, the higher the cost of equity required by investors. The coefficient is 
significant at the 1% level. Finally, the losses indicator coefficient is positive and significant at 
1% level. Investors require a higher return for firms that are incurring losses in order to 
compensate for the risk. 
 




4.5.4 Voluntary Disclosures in the Audit Committee Report and Financial Analysts’ Forecast 
Properties 
4.5.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 22 presents the variables related to the financial analysts forecast properties. In this section 
we discuss the ones that were not discussed in prior sections. Forecast error measures the 
inaccuracy of the financial analysts in predicting future earnings. The mean (median) of forecast 
error is 0.06 (0.005) and a standard deviation of 0.24. As for the dispersion error, the mean 
(median) is -0.15 (-0.09) and a standard deviation of 0.3. Table 23 shows the forecast errors and 
dispersion variables per year. It is evident that the crisis period has significantly increased the 
inaccuracies of financial analysts in predicting future earnings.   Similar to prior studies, we use 
the natural logarithm of forecast error and the natural logarithm of forecast dispersion to reduce 
the skewness of these two variables.  
 
[INSERT TABLES 22 AND 23 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 Table 24 presents the correlation among the variables. The main variable, voluntary 
disclosure score, is negatively related to LnForecast error and LnDispersion. This means that the 
the voluntary disclosure in the audit committee reports are improving the financial analysts 
forecast abilities. The correlation coefficient is not significant except for Ln Forecast error at the 
10% level.    
 
[INSERT TABLE 24 ABOUT HERE] 
4.5.4.2 Multivariate Analysis 
For testing hypothesis H4, we regress Ln Forecast error on voluntary disclosure score and a set 
of control variables. The regression results are presented in table 25. The coefficient of voluntary 
disclosure score (-0.065; p-value<0.01) is negative and significant at the 1% level.  It implies that 
the voluntary disclosures in the audit committee report are assisting financial analysts in making 
better earnings forecast in the future. For the control variables, size is positively related to 
forecast error. This implies that financial analysts’ are less accurate in forecasting larger banks 
which is against our prediction. As for the performance of the bank measured by ROE, the 
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coefficient is negative and significant at 5%. Financial analysts make less forecast errors for 
better performing banks. Similarly, financial analysts have more difficulty in forecasting 
earnings for banks’ with losses. The coefficient of banks having negative earnings is positive and 
significant at 1% level. Finally, we control for the number of financial experts on the audit 
committee. As expected, audit committee financial experts improve the oversight of audit 
committees; thus the financial analysts will be able to make better earnings forecast. The 
coefficient of audit committee financial experts is positive and significant at the 5% level. The 
adjusted R square is 36.4% meaning that the model is well explained. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 25 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 Our next test, hypothesis H5, is to analyze the effect voluntary disclosures in the audit 
committee report on financial analysts’ forecast dispersion. We regress Ln Dispersion on 
voluntary disclosure score and a set of control variables. The regression results are presented in 
table 26. The coefficient of voluntary disclosures score is negative implying that the higher the 
voluntary disclosures the less the financial analysts forecast dispersion. This is in line with 
hypothesis H5 testing that suggested that financial analysts make less forecast errors when 
voluntary disclosures is higher. As for the control variables, the bank size is negatively related to 
dispersion and significant at 1% level. It suggests that financial analysts’ dispersion is less when 
banks are bigger in size. Finally, our model reveals that financial analysts’ dispersion is higher 
whenever the bank is incurring losses. This is similar to financial analysts’ forecast error which 
increases whenever banks are incurring losses. Banks in financial distress create a difficult 
environment for financial analysts to forecast future earnings. The adjusted R square is 21.7% 
meaning that the model is well explained. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 26 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 The results of our testing in H4 and H5 infer that the financial analysts’ are benefitting by 
using the voluntary disclosures in the audit committee report. Even though, the first part of the 
study suggest that that the voluntary disclosures are impression management by the audit 
committees, the financial analysts are still learning something about these firms and 
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incorporating this information in their forecasts. The financial analysts’ know that there is a 
positive association between the voluntary disclosures in the audit committee report and earnings 
management. This information is incorporated in their forecast; thus they are able to make less 
forecasting error and forecasting dispersion.   
4.6 Conclusion 
 In this chapter we analyze quantitatively the voluntary disclosures in the audit committee 
reports of the top US bank holding companies. The chapter is composed of two parts: The first 
part investigates the association between the extent of voluntary disclosures in the audit 
committee report and earnings management; and, the second part analyses the association 
between voluntary disclosures and the cost of equity, and the financial analyst forecasting 
properties. On the one hand, the descriptive results show that the voluntary disclosures did not 
significantly increase over 10 years. The average voluntary disclosures was 3.94 in 2004 and 
increased to 4.55 in 2014. The increase over a period of 10 years is very minimal which is in line 
with the investors comment letters arguing that the voluntary disclosures did not increase 
significantly. On the other hand, the multivariate analysis suggest that audit committees provide 
more voluntary disclosures whenever the earnings management are high. These results imply 
that audit committees are engaged in impression management since they disclose more about 
their oversight activities when managers manipulate the bank's earnings. The second part's 
results of our study suggests that there is an association between cost of equity and voluntary 
disclosures in the audit committee report. As the voluntary disclosures are impression 
management practices by audit committees, the cost of equity will be increasing when audit 
committees increase the level of voluntary disclosures. However, the results suggest that the 
voluntary disclosures improve the financial analysts forecasting accuracy and forecasting 
dispersion. The study results suggest that the financial analysts recognize the voluntary 
disclosures as impression management practices by the audit committees. Thus, the implied cost 
of equity is higher for firms’ with higher voluntary disclosures in their audit committee reports. 
Since the financial analysts know that the voluntary disclosures are impression management, 
they incorporate this information in their forecasting leading to less forecasting errors and less 
dispersion. Even though, the voluntary disclosures are impression management practice by audit 
committees there is an economic impact on the external environment. The cost of equity is 
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higher since the financial analysts know it is associated with higher earnings management. 
However such information is still benefiting the financial analysts who are incorporating it in 
their forecasts and are able to make better forecasts.  
 In 2015, the SEC issued the concept release proposing enhancements in the current audit 
committee requirements. Our results have public policy implications, they provide empirical 





Chapter 5: Conclusion 
In this dissertation, we investigate the voluntary disclosures in the audit committee report. 
In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in the voluntary disclosures in the audit 
committee report by different stakeholders such as corporate governance organizations and 
institutional investors. Based on the different requests for enhanced audit committee disclosures, 
the SEC issued a concept release proposing several enhancements and requesting public 
comment. As stated in the concept release document, the SEC main interest in requesting public 
comment is to understand “investors’ needs” in the context of audit committee disclosures. Also, 
the SEC concept release discussed the scarcity of research around that topic which is limiting its 
knowledge as to why some firms disclose additional voluntary disclosures in their audit 
committee report and whether these disclosures are useful for investors’ decisions (Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), 2015). Thus, we consider that the dissertation is addressing a 
timely topic that has not been fully analyzed in the previous literature and providing some 
answers to the SEC and interested stakeholders. We assess “investors’ needs” in the context of 
audit committee disclosures by reviewing and analyzing the comment letters that were submitted 
by different stakeholders. Also, we investigate the motives of audit committees to disclose 
voluntary disclosures in their report: is it incremental information that shows strong performance 
by the audit committees? Or, it is impression management practiced by the audit committees to 
hide their weak performance? Finally, we study the consequences of the voluntary disclosures on 
external stakeholders, as captured by the implied cost of equity and the financial analysts' 
forecasting properties. 
In Chapter 2, we provide a background on the audit committee report that all public 
firms’ audit committees are required to issue on annual basis since 1999 (Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), 1999). Then, we present the debate between the different 
stakeholders. On the one hand, investors and corporate governance organizations are not satisfied 
with the current audit committee disclosures as they do not provide useful information to 
investors (Audit Committee Collaboration, 2012). On the other hand, audit committees and audit 
firms argue that audit committees voluntary disclosures have significantly increased since 2012 
(Center for Audit Quality, 2017; EY Center for Board Matters, 2016). The debate between the 
different stakeholders which has been taking place since 2012 together with the SEC action raise 
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concerns regarding what exactly are “investors’ needs” in the context of audit committee 
disclosures and thus motivate our study.  
In the third chapter, we analyze the content of the comment letters submitted by the 
different respondents following the SEC concept release. Our main objective is to understand 
“investors’ needs” in the context of the audit committee disclosures. For that purpose, we utilize 
the concept of frames that was studied previously in discourse analysis (Benford & Snow, 2000; 
Goffman, 1959; Snow & Benford, 1988). We use framing as an analytical tool to analyze how 
each respondent category defines “investors’ needs” and how they attempt to convince the SEC 
to embrace their views. Our results show that there is a wide variation among respondents in 
defining “investors’ needs” and how they argue to convince the SEC to adopt their point of view. 
Also, the discourse analysis reveals several issues at the corporate governance level. For 
example, audit committees’ power, independence, and effectiveness are topics that are discussed 
by the different respondents. Investors express high concerns about these corporate governance 
issues that require the SEC attention. 
In the fourth chapter, we adopt a quantitative approach by analyzing audit committee 
reports released by the top US bank holding companies. The chapter is divided to two parts: 1) 
we investigate the association between voluntary disclosures in the audit committee reports and 
earnings management, 2) we analyze the impact of voluntary disclosures on the external 
environment. These two research questions attempt to provide empirical results in response to 
the SEC questions that were raised in the concept release. For the first part of the chapter, results 
indicate that there is a positive association between the voluntary disclosures and banks’ earnings 
management. The higher the banks’ managers engage in earnings management, the higher the 
voluntary disclosures in the audit committee reports. In our view, it implies that audit committees 
are engaged in impression management. As for the results of the second part of the chapter, 
results suggest that there is a positive relationship between voluntary disclosures and implied 
cost of equity. The higher the voluntary disclosures level, the higher the investors’ required rate 
of return. It implies that the investors are able to know that the voluntary disclosures do not 
reveal strong performance by the audit committees and as a consequence, they will require a 
higher rate of return. As for financial analysts’ forecasting properties, it seems that they have 
learned that these voluntary disclosures are impression management. They are able to make 
better forecasting as the results suggest a negative relationship between voluntary disclosures and 
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forecasting errors and forecasting dispersion. Even though voluntary disclosures are consistent 
with impression management, they still have economic value since they are benefiting financial 
analysts in making better forecasts. 
In addition to the academic literature contribution, the dissertation provides several 
practical implications. On February 24, 2017, the SEC announced its plan to modernize 
corporate disclosures by facilitating the investors’ tasks in locating and using the information. 
Michael Piwowar, the acting SEC chairman, focused on the need to “provide meaningful 
disclosure improvements for the forgotten investor” (Reuters, 2017). For the regulator, the 
framing analysis of the comment letters provides evidence about the need to have a common 
understanding of the “investors’ needs” in the audit committee disclosure context. The 
qualitative study is focusing on “investors’ needs” which is a critical concern for the SEC. 
Second, one of the regulator’s goal is to ensure that investors maintain confidence in financial 
markets. The quantitative study analyzes impression management by audit committees. Having a 
sub-committee of the board, audit committees, engage in impression management can have bad 
consequences on investors’ confidence. The empirical results of our study are very important for 
the SEC and boards of directors whose aim is to ensure that investors have confidence in the US 
financial markets. As stated by the SEC former Chair, Mary Jo White: “markets depend on 
investors, who must have confidence in relying on the information in the marketplace” 
(Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 2017). 
  Our dissertation is subject to several limitations. First, the qualitative study relies on 
ninety-one comment letters drafted by investors and cross-section of governance actors. The 
number of comment letters is considered limited; thus it can be considered not representative of 
the different views. In qualitative research, the researcher stops collecting further information 
whenever feels there has been saturation of the different point of views (Malsch & Salterio, 
2015). In this paper, the saturation level may not have been reached. Second, the comment letters 
are drafted by different stakeholders; however they may have considered the public expectations, 
so the responses can be written in a way that is politically correct. Thus, the letters may be biased 
and not reflect the true intentions of the respondents. Third, the quantitative study considers the 
top US bank holding companies as the audit committee reports are manually coded. Our sample 
may not be representative of all the US bank holding companies; however, we do not believe our 
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Table 1 Comment Letters Submitted to SEC 




              Letters requesting deadline extension 
  
-7 
           Letters content unrelated to concept release 
  
-4 
Total number of comment letters analyzed 
  
91 
    
    
Respondents category 
Number of 
letters %  


































Table 2 Frames summary 
 
Frame Diagnosis Prognosis Motivation 
Investors Lack of transparency Change the current 
requirements 
Change is in great 
need to protect 
investors 
Academia Woefully inadequate 
with no value for 
investors 
Change the current 
requirements 
Disclosures to become 
a signaling device 
Management & Legal Investors fully 
informed 
Keep status quo Change will bring 
negative 
consequences 
Audit committees Investors fully 
informed 
Keep status quo Some changes may be 
beneficial for 
investors 
External auditors Investors not 
adequately informed 















Table 3 Descriptive Statistics of Voluntary Disclosures in the Audit Committee Report 
Year Voluntary disclosures categories N Mean Std Dev Min 25th percentile Median 75th percentile Max 
          
20051231 Internal controls and risk management oversight 102 0.764706 0.869465 0 0 1 1 5 
 
Financial reporting oversight 102 0.039216 0.240526 0 0 0 0 2 
 
External auditor oversight 102 2.343137 2.310094 0 1 2 3 12 
 
Internal auditor oversight 102 0.833333 1.282659 0 0 0 1 6 
 
Total 103 3.941748 3.621356 0 1 3 5 17 
20081231 Internal controls and risk management oversight 103 0.796117 0.922053 0 0 1 1 6 
 
Financial reporting oversight 103 0.048544 0.324752 0 0 0 0 3 
 
External auditor oversight 103 2.368932 2.169261 0 0 2 4 9 
 
Internal auditor oversight 103 0.76699 1.254044 0 0 0 1 6 
 
Total 103 3.980583 3.629888 0 1 3 6 19 
20111231 Internal controls and risk management oversight 103 0.854369 0.922569 0 0 1 1 6 
 
Financial reporting oversight 103 0.058252 0.337965 0 0 0 0 3 
 
External auditor oversight 103 2.524272 2.711069 0 1 2 4 19 
 
Internal auditor oversight 103 0.796117 1.247423 0 0 0 1 6 
 
Total 103 4.23301 3.913786 0 1 3 6 20 
20141231 Internal controls and risk management oversight 103 0.893204 0.917292 0 0 1 1 6 
 
Financial reporting oversight 103 0.067961 0.426158 0 0 0 0 4 
 
External auditor oversight 103 2.786408 2.959367 0 1 2 4 18 
 
Internal auditor oversight 103 0.805825 1.188658 0 0 0 1 6 
 
Total 103 4.553398 4.009127 0 1 4 7 20 
Total Internal controls and risk management oversight 411 0.827251 0.906258 0 0 1 1 6 
 
Financial reporting oversight 411 0.053528 0.337936 0 0 0 0 4 
 
External auditor oversight 411 2.506083 2.554162 0 1 2 4 19 
 
Internal auditor oversight 411 0.800487 1.239236 0 0 0 1 6 
 
Total 412 4.177184 3.791419 0 1 3 6 20 
115 
 
Table 4 Descriptive Statistics of the Main Variables for First Part of the Study 
variable N mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max 
         LLPSc 412 0.007189 0.009649 -0.01817 0.001573 0.003609 0.009773 0.055043 
BEGLLASc 412 0.016482 0.008947 0.001153 0.011611 0.013874 0.01779 0.086127 
BEGNPLSc 412 0.01855 0.022129 0 0.005944 0.011079 0.022715 0.17792 
CHNPLSc 412 0.00072 0.012764 -0.05354 -0.00397 -0.00024 0.004045 0.062088 
LCOSc 412 0.006809 0.008652 -0.00115 0.001637 0.003641 0.008797 0.066103 
CHLOANSSc 412 0.11037 0.228646 -0.42221 0.022834 0.070135 0.145247 2.48056 
LOANSSc 412 1.11037 0.228646 0.577785 1.022834 1.070135 1.145247 3.48056 
COMMSc 412 0.209712 0.149103 4.03E-06 0.115044 0.176972 0.248476 1.006653 
CONSc 412 0.057139 0.0656 0.000401 0.013357 0.031658 0.07809 0.627105 
RESTATESc 412 0.73027 0.257542 0 0.584501 0.742465 0.845396 2.742302 
AGRISc 412 0.009404 0.0173 0 5.81E-05 0.001661 0.011255 0.138441 
FBGSc 412 0.000198 0.001313 0 0 0 0 0.021948 
DEPINSSc 412 0.002778 0.013975 0 0 0 0.000534 0.168994 
DLLP 412 -1.7E-05 0.003116 -0.01101 -0.00141 -3.7E-05 0.001224 0.014622 
Big4 412 0.764563 0.424787 0 1 1 1 1 
Leverage 412 9.05435 2.208979 4.786924 7.420092 8.725506 10.23434 15.62796 
EBTPSc 412 0.028558 0.019061 -0.04239 0.020709 0.026656 0.035554 0.111417 
Loss 412 0.038835 0.193436 0 0 0 0 1 
MtoB 409 1.209724 0.286428 0.760139 1.009454 1.162812 1.350687 2.176249 
LnTotalAssets 412 23.26418 1.591327 21.42755 22.08615 22.78257 23.8394 28.37512 
Tier1CommRatio 412 10.35608 3.255288 3.19 8.04 10.09 12.2 22.11 
Tier1RiskRatio 412 12.67126 3.019966 7.56 10.72 12.33 13.955 25.48 
Defensive 412 0.080097 0.271774 0 0 0 0 1 
MDAPages 412 36.32767 19.2162 9 23.5 32 44 106 
ACSize 412 4.61165 1.156663 3 4 4 5 8 
ACMeeting 412 9.635922 3.885023 4 6 10 12 20 
ACFEPerc 412 0.433393 0.270051 0 0.25 0.333333 0.6 1 
ACFemale 412 0.606796 0.680455 0 0 0 1 2 
ACChairFem~e 412 0.126214 0.332494 0 0 0 0 1 
Institutional investors 410 1.834146 1.374517 0 1 2 3 8 
BoardSize 412 12.53155 3.017625 7 10 12 14 21 
BoardFemale% 412 0.122833 0.081211 0 0.074176 0.111111 0.166667 0.428571 
BoardIndependence% 412 0.873659 0.064236 0.625 0.846154 0.888889 0.916667 0.944444 




Table 5 Correlation Matrix of Scaled Variables for the First Regression 
 
LLP BEGLLA BEGNPL CHNPL LCO CHLOANS LOANS COMM CON RESTATE AGRI FBG DEPINS 
LLP 1 
            BEGLLA 0.108* 1 
           BEGNPL 0.171*** 0.669*** 1 
          CHNPL 0.339*** -0.474*** -0.428*** 1 
         LCO 0.837*** 0.495*** 0.436*** -0.077 1 
        CHLOANS -0.072 -0.207*** -0.203*** 0.327*** -0.209*** 1 
       LOANS -0.072 -0.207*** -0.203*** 0.327*** -0.209*** 1.000*** 1 
      COMM -0.0245 -0.0329 -0.106* 0.134** -0.100* 0.414*** 0.414*** 1 
     CON 0.182*** -0.0295 -0.172*** 0.188*** 0.0856 0.0955 0.0955 -0.00121 1 
    RESTATE -0.0771 -0.168*** -0.0822 0.206*** -0.159** 0.568*** 0.568*** -0.234*** -0.177*** 1 
   AGRI -0.119* -0.0422 -0.0554 -0.0115 -0.132** 0.0952 0.0952 -0.0088 0.0542 0.0769 1 
  FBG -0.0177 -0.0029 -0.00235 -0.0308 0.00336 -0.0557 -0.0557 -0.0152 -0.0237 -0.216*** -0.0742 1 





Table 6 Correlation Matrix of the Second Step Regression 
 
Voluntary disclosure score Abs DLLP Big 4 EBTP Loss MtoB Ln Total Assets Tier1 Comm Ratio Tier1 Risk Ratio Defensive 
Voluntary disclosure score 1 
         
Abs DLLP 0.0332 1 
        
Big4 -0.165*** -0.0384 1 
       
EBTP -0.00586 -0.0162 0.0680 1 
      
Loss -0.00969 0.0916 0.0149 -0.466*** 1 
     
MtoB 0.0563 -0.0992* -0.00111 0.265*** -0.140** 1 
    
Ln Total Assets -0.0345 0.0382 0.342*** 0.238*** -0.0505 -0.232*** 1 
   
Tier1 Comm Ratio 0.0810 -0.0415 -0.0808 0.217*** -0.144** 0.0869 0.163*** 1 
  
Tier1RiskRatio -0.0119 0.103* -0.142** 0.102* 0.00865 -0.150** -0.188*** 0.835*** 1 
 
Defensive 0.300*** 0.0271 0.0141 -0.0300 0.0377 0.0234 0.145** -0.0837 -0.0607 1 
MD&A Pages -0.0587 0.0339 0.288*** 0.108* -0.0465 -0.300*** 0.646*** -0.0197 0.0182 -0.0157 
AC Size -0.0768 -0.0640 0.100* -0.0245 0.0187 -0.0415 0.177*** 0.00838 -0.0221 -0.0781 
AC Meeting -0.0457 0.0811 -0.00915 0.0829 0.0471 -0.208*** 0.246*** -0.0426 0.0204 0.136** 
ACFEPerc -0.0658 -0.0178 0.283*** 0.105* -0.000821 -0.0858 0.287*** -0.0626 -0.0706 -0.0152 
AC Female 0.0431 0.0292 0.159** -0.0166 0.0139 -0.0465 0.269*** -0.00585 -0.0836 -0.0168 
AC Chair Female -0.0189 0.000757 0.140** 0.00588 -0.0745 -0.0545 0.180*** -0.0781 -0.144** -0.113* 
Institutional investors -0.0651 -0.00108 0.0704 -0.0313 -0.0150 -0.0828 -0.136** 0.289*** 0.268*** -0.0502 
Board Size 0.0308 -0.135** 0.115* 0.0548 -0.0765 0.0726 0.262*** -0.184*** -0.293*** -0.0722 
Board Female Perc 0.0143 -0.0185 0.0919 0.0619 0.00708 -0.0774 0.344*** 0.0718 0.0171 0.00362 
Board Independent Perc 0.0280 -0.0399 0.320*** 0.00461 0.0377 -0.0990* 0.238*** -0.0759 -0.115* -0.0501 






MDAPages ACSize ACMeeting ACFEPerc ACFemale ACChairFemale 
Institutional 




          
ACSize 0.0149 1          
ACMeeting 0.289*** -0.0418 1 
        
ACFEPerc 0.159** -0.113* 0.0364 1 
       
ACFemale 0.148** 0.331*** -0.0602 0.0979* 1 
      
ACChairFemale 0.146** 0.0909 -0.0762 0.0471 0.382*** 1 
     
Institutional investors 0.0195 0.0295 -0.0354 0.0583 0.0719 0.0289 1 
    
BoardSize 0.0428 0.268*** -0.00463 0.0134 0.132** 0.149** -0.153** 1 
   
BoardFemalePerc 0.280*** 0.0599 0.00106 0.195*** 0.506*** 0.156** 0.0743 -0.00427 1 
  
BoardIndependentPerc 0.218*** 0.253*** -0.0217 0.0328 0.242*** 0.106* 0.228*** 0.153** 0.182*** 1 
 




Table 7 Results of Regression of LLP on Determinants of Normal LLP   
 
Independent variables LLPSc 
  Coef. t 
BEGLLASc -0.24454*** 16.78 
BEGNPLSc 0.03662*** 6.54 
CHNPLSc 0.1001319*** 15.03 
LCOSc 1.032982*** 83.05 
CHLOANSSc -0.0010901 -1.52 
COMMSc 0.0024367*** 2.89 
CONSc 0.0007856 0.56 
RESTATESc 0.0006592 1.06 
AGRISc 0.0066528* 1.82 
FBGSc -0.0798909 -1.22 
DEPINSSc -0.008353 -1.32 
Years-Control Yes   
Observations 1,586    











  Coef. t 
DLLPNegative -189.3928*** -6.83 
Big4 -2.218581* -3.16 
EBTPSc 2.528141 0.14 
Loss -1.208333 -1.26 
MtoB -1.067889 -1.45 
LnTotalAssets -0.0083025 -0.02 
Tier1CommRatio 0.4269226 2.06 
Tier1RiskRatio -0.3531682 -1.48 
Defensive 4.934976** 4.25 
MDAPages 0.0039765 0.26 
ACSize -0.2898708 -1.29 
ACMeeting -0.0587354 -0.86 
ACFEPerc -0.3387997 -0.35 
ACFemale 0.1371755 0.32 
ACChairFemale -0.4914125 -0.37 
Institutional investors -0.1635009 -1.42 
BoardSize 0.0084158 0.12 
BoardFemalePerc 0.0608505 0.01 
BoardIndependentPerc 9.22445*** 6.69 
CEODuality -1.384993** -3.5 
Constant 1.35118 0.14 
Years-Control Yes   
Observations 213    










  Coef. t 
DLLPPositive 68.30268 0.79 
Big4 -1.513822* -3.05 
EBTPSc 6.17268 0.49 
Loss 2.926004** 4.55 
MtoB 0.405713 0.78 
LnTotalAssets -0.2800833* -2.87 
Tier1CommRatio 0.4778265** 5.17 
Tier1RiskRatio -0.3986083** -4.19 
Defensive 3.923597** 5.21 
MDAPages 0.0288857 1.83 
ACSize -0.3495911 -1.64 
ACMeeting -0.1184384** -3.2 
ACFEPerc 0.4408486 0.65 
ACFemale 0.7435221* 2.79 
ACChairFemale 0.447322 0.73 
Institutional investors -0.4721907** -4.22 
BoardSize 0.1749702*** 9.36 
BoardFemalePerc -3.566659 -1.35 
BoardIndependentPerc 8.566477 1.93 
CEODuality -0.4073674 -1.05 
Constant 3.638864 0.72 
Years-Control Yes   
Observations 196    














  Coef. t 
AbsDLLP 106.7992*** 6.07 
Big4 -1.822895*** -6.59 
EBTPSc 4.781732 0.53 
Loss 0.8609114 1.74 
MtoB -0.6295369 -1.56 
LnTotalAssets -0.1858615 -1.49 
Tier1CommRatio 0.491684** 4.73 
Tier1RiskRatio -0.4215591* -3.01 
Defensive 4.788344*** 9.06 
MDAPages 0.0148714 1.15 
ACSize -0.3214301* -2.42 
ACMeeting -0.0898345** -3.87 
ACFEPerc 0.1654752 0.42 
ACFemale 0.4363106 1.93 
ACChairFemale -0.0104104 -0.02 
Institutional investors -0.307827*** -12.89 
BoardSize 0.0864625* 2.42 
BoardFemalePerc -1.57959 -0.54 
BoardIndependentPerc 7.612437** 4.54 
CEODuality -0.9262575 -2.9 
Constant 5.121599 1.61 
Years-Control Yes   
Observations 409    












Table 11 Results of Logit Regression of “Defensive Language” Variable 
Independent variables Defensive language 
  Coef. t 
Voluntary disclosure 
score 0.3100901*** 10.75 
Big4 1.10622** 2.15 
EBTPSc -49.96168** -2.23 
Loss -1.536783 -1.18 
MtoB 3.253194*** 3.04 
LnTotalAssets 1.174993*** 3.8 
Tier1CommRatio -0.3102221*** -2.52 
Tier1RiskRatio 0.2805949* 1.71 
MDAPages -0.0558915 -1.55 
ACSize -0.321088 -1.29 
ACMeeting 0.1582641*** 3.11 
ACFEPerc -1.880938*** -3.9 
ACFemale -0.3233174 -1.19 
Institutional investors 0.2215228*** 2.63 
BoardSize -0.2631347*** -4.37 
BoardFemalePerc -1.186798 -0.99 
BoardIndependentPerc -8.014633*** -3.09 
CEODuality 0.6319839 0.81 
Constant -23.40818*** -3.09 
Years-Control Yes   
Observations 409    











Table 12 Results of Regression of Voluntary Disclosure Score on DLLP Negative 
Independent variables Voluntary disclosure score 
  Coef. t 
DLLPNegative -104.8002** -4.43 
Big4 -1.975681** -3.27 
Leverage -5.549829 -1.13 
EBTPSc 5.687504 0.51 
Loss -0.0320902 -0.02 
BtoM 0.7065856 0.35 
LnTotalAssets -0.3515938 -2.07 
Tier1CommRatio 0.4442415 1.77 
Tier1RiskRatio -0.4181417 -1.38 
Defensive 3.742708** 5.2 
MDAPages 0.0437188 1.7 
ACSize -0.2835559 -1.22 
ACMeeting -0.1173965*** -7.73 
ACFEPerc -0.5559921 -0.46 
ACFemale 0.4997148 1.88 
ACChairFemale -0.149029 -0.18 
Institutional investors -0.5041022 -0.33 
BoardSize 0.0378419 0.88 
BoardFemalePerc 0.7024653 0.37 
BoardIndependentPerc 3.523327 1.09 
CEODuality -1.246637** -3.65 
Constant 16.17793 3.71 
Years-Control Yes   
Observations 250    















  Coef. t 
DLLPPositive 42.85792 1.96 
Big4 -1.25807 -1.59 
Leverage -35.64436* -2.71 
EBTPSc 16.44654 0.81 
Loss 2.13551 1.45 
BtoM -2.417619 -1.24 
LnTotalAssets 0.0943962 0.96 
Tier1CommRatio 0.4058599** 4.99 
Tier1RiskRatio -0.4476981** -4.78 
Defensive 6.487969** 4.04 
MDAPages -0.0008113 -0.03 
ACSize -0.4692992** -3.47 
ACMeeting -0.068235 -1.18 
ACFEPerc 0.4625271 0.57 
ACFemale 0.2506412 0.38 
ACChairFemale -0.1360048 -0.09 
Institutional investors -1.402863 -0.82 
BoardSize 0.1423945 2.24 
BoardFemalePerc -7.15548 -1.57 
BoardIndependentPerc 8.580838** 3.28 
CEODuality -0.5153941 -0.84 
Constant 32.61233* 2.72 
Years-Control Yes   
Observations 150    











Table 14 Results of Regression of Voluntary Disclosure Score on Absolute DLLP 
Independent variables Voluntary disclosure score 
  Coef. t 
AbsDLLP 66.4128** 2.24 
Big4 -1.936196*** -3.28 
Leverage -11.15028 -1.2 
EBTPSc 3.147537 0.33 
Loss 0.9216998 1.05 
BtoM -0.8978305 -0.76 
LnTotalAssets -0.0359407 -0.18 
Tier1CommRatio 0.4381569*** 3.84 
Tier1RiskRatio -0.4265596*** -3.71 
Defensive 4.585454*** 5.63 
MDAPages 0.0163299 1.24 
ACSize -0.345717* -1.9 
ACMeeting -0.0852185* -1.87 
ACFEPerc 0.0409854 0.06 
ACFemale 0.414543 1.13 
ACChairFemale 0.1331274 0.21 
Institutional investors -0.9213998 -0.92 
BoardSize 0.0700623 1.08 
BoardFemalePerc -2.014447 -0.77 
BoardIndependentPerc 6.115694** 1.96 
CEODuality -0.9603444*** -2.57 
Constant 13.93552 1.24 
Years-Control Yes   
Observations 400    















  Coef. t 
DLLPNegative -34.47779** -4.11 
Big4 -0.0996229 -1.2 
EBTPSc -1.873661 -2.11 
Loss -0.1042647 -0.88 
MtoB -0.081186 -0.59 
LnTotalAssets -0.0622934 -1.99 
Tier1CommRatio 0.0691101** 4.75 
Tier1RiskRatio -0.0760647** -3.91 
Defensive 0.4723321** 3.33 
MDAPages 0.0053553* 2.93 
ACSize 0.0213723 0.6 
ACMeeting -0.0025663 -0.29 
ACFEPerc -0.1336014 -0.76 
ACFemale -0.0291715 -0.44 
ACChairFemale -0.1126615 -0.56 
Institutional investors -0.0523438** -4.4 
BoardSize 0.0019762 0.12 
BoardFemalePerc -0.1518522 -0.24 
BoardIndependentPerc 0.615647 1.58 
CEODuality -0.2366047** -4 
Constant 1.79156 2.01 
Years-Control Yes   
Observations 213    














  Coef. t 
DLLPPositive 8.267741 0.62 
Big4 -0.0188388 -0.17 
EBTPSc 2.531667 1.87 
Loss 0.7783369*** 8.03 
MtoB -0.0469675 -0.81 
LnTotalAssets -0.0965149** -5.27 
Tier1CommRatio 0.0635042** 4.17 
Tier1RiskRatio -0.0462847* -2.75 
Defensive 0.3281477 2.22 
MDAPages 0.005446** 4.35 
ACSize 0.020042 1.31 
ACMeeting -0.0163238* -2.72 
ACFEPerc 0.1714588 1 
ACFemale 0.0926579* 2.55 
ACChairFemale -0.0100657 -0.13 
Institutional investors -0.0694504*** -7.05 
BoardSize 0.0325574** 3.97 
BoardFemalePerc -0.9852857 -2.18 
BoardIndependentPerc 0.7741697 1.33 
CEODuality -0.1136865 -2.01 
Constant 1.582915 2.23 
Years-Control Yes   
Observations 196    















  Coef. t 
AbsDLLP 16.8566* 2.83 
Big4 -0.0488547 -1.49 
EBTPSc 0.2036203 0.21 
Loss 0.2940657** 3.74 
MtoB -0.1125626 -2.2 
LnTotalAssets -0.0807817*** -6.62 
Tier1CommRatio 0.0744324** 4.59 
Tier1RiskRatio -0.0703311** -3.83 
Defensive 0.4454917*** 8.93 
MDAPages 0.0051685*** 23.55 
ACSize 0.0252566 2.02 
ACMeeting -0.0113004** -3.62 
ACFEPerc 0.0396221 0.35 
ACFemale 0.0438517 0.81 
ACChairFemale -0.0768345 -0.83 
Institutional investors -0.0546141*** -9.86 
BoardSize 0.0165935* 2.94 
BoardFemalePerc -0.5547814 -1.44 
BoardIndependentPerc 0.3370869 1.8 
CEODuality -0.1783097** -3.94 
Constant 2.110503*** 10.91 
Years-Control Yes   
Observations 409    








Table 18 Descriptive Statistics of the Variables Related to Cost of Equity Study 
 
N Mean Std Dev Min 25th percentile Median 75th percentile Max 
RAverage 392 0.1713058 0.3090755 0.0239199 0.0796928 0.0976126 0.1354968 4.080155 
Voluntary disclosure score 412 4.167476 3.794427 0 1 3 6 20 
Leverage 412 9.106113 2.47838 3.630703 7.420092 8.725506 10.23434 25.23467 
LnTotalAssets 412 23.26419 1.594764 21.2478 22.08615 22.78257 23.8394 28.57581 
ROE 412 0.0635275 0.1621645 -1.937755 0.0554737 0.0877517 0.1154802 0.2655377 
MtoB 409 1.211151 0.2949756 0.6791379 1.009454 1.162812 1.350687 2.720968 
InvPrice 410 0.0671101 0.1082429 0.0039559 0.0266383 0.0381607 0.0691085 1.030928 
CEODuality 412 0.5072816 0.5005548 0 0 1 1 1 
LnTier1Commonratio 411 2.288678 0.3335598 0.5306283 2.084429 2.313525 2.501436 3.291754 
LnDispersion 384 -5.49479 1.432311 -8.213382 -6.46787 -5.710713 -4.760032 0.7130666 


























        
Leverage 0.164** -0.0532 1 
       
Ln Total Assets 0.0605 -0.0368 -0.0273 1 
      
ROE -0.397*** 0.0141 0.00984 0.0201 1 
     




    




   





-0.391*** 0.105* -0.375*** 
-
0.213*** 



























Table 20 Correlation of the Four Measures Used in Calculating Cost of Equity 
 
Rpeg Rojn Rmpeg1 RAver 
     Rpeg 1 
   Rojn 0.928*** 1 
  Rmpeg1 0.929*** 1.000*** 1 





Table 21 Results of Regression of Cost of Equity 







  Coef. t   Coef. t   Coef. t   Coef. t 
















































































Adjusted R2 0.6614     0.5118     0.5194     0.5584   
 
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
 
     





Table 22 Descriptive Statistics of Financial Analysts Forecast Properties 
 
N Mean Std Dev Min 25th percentile Median 75th percentile Max 
Voluntary disclosure score 412 4.167476 3.794427 0 1 3 6 20 
ForecastError 402 0.0635594 0.2406058 0 0.0021471 0.0056781 0.0169051 2.261628 
LnForecastError 396 -4.905374 1.837157 -9.270894 -6.11281 -5.12845 -4.053662 0.8160849 
Dispersion 384 -0.1517673 0.3003401 -3.318429 -0.1621826 -0.0944839 -0.0497807 0.3940693 
LnDispersion 384 -2.362468 0.9984628 -7.651789 -2.887107 -2.31761 -1.806707 1.199491 
Leverage 412 9.106113 2.47838 3.630703 7.420092 8.725506 10.23434 25.23467 
LnTotalAssets 412 23.26419 1.594764 21.2478 22.08615 22.78257 23.8394 28.57581 
ROE 412 0.0635275 0.1621645 -1.937755 0.0554737 0.0877517 0.1154802 0.2655377 
Institutional ownership 410 0.5538537 0.2087283 0.08 0.4 0.56 0.7 1 
CEODuality 412 0.5072816 0.5005548 0 0 1 1 1 
Tier1RiskRatio 412 12.74391 3.474724 6.21 10.72 12.33 13.955 40.57 
BoardSize 412 12.54369 3.068644 6 10 12 14 24 
Negative Earnings 412 0.092233 0.2897064 0 0 0 0 1 
ACSize 412 4.621359 1.195014 3 4 4 5 11 





Table 23 Descriptive Statistics of Financial Analysts Forecast Properties 





          20051231 Forecast Error 100 0.027579 0.120643 0 0.0011941 0.003422 0.0077737 1.073328 
 
LnForecastError 98 -5.52665 1.589622 -9.27089 -6.672982 -5.64452 -4.8519 0.070764 
 
Dispersion 94 -0.13368 0.336567 -3.31843 -0.1355316 -0.09418 -0.0599642 0.005087 
 
LnDispersion 94 -2.47829 0.908311 -7.65179 -2.814008 -2.36258 -1.99855 1.199491 
          20081231 Forecast Error 100 0.176073 0.42679 0.000169 0.0060005 0.017902 0.0918965 2.261628 
 
LnForecastError 100 -3.77425 2.134608 -8.68744 -5.115939 -4.023 -2.389669 0.816085 
 
Dispersion 91 -0.05161 0.118495 -0.3429 -0.102236 -0.05635 -0.0215084 0.394069 
 
LnDispersion 91 -2.75729 0.960957 -5.7222 -3.395467 -2.75529 -2.006417 -0.93123 
          20111231 Forecast Error 101 0.043941 0.139592 0 0.0039913 0.007642 0.0218579 1.27686 
 
LnForecastError 100 -4.58542 1.602233 -7.93021 -5.510989 -4.82817 -3.823192 0.244404 
 
Dispersion 98 -0.27611 0.437922 -2.69735 -0.2718518 -0.13228 -0.0821808 -0.00735 
 
LnDispersion 98 -1.92428 1.090108 -4.91338 -2.498834 -2.0231 -1.302498 0.992271 
          20141231 Forecast Error 101 0.007402 0.019803 0 0.00123 0.003181 0.0058908 0.142144 
 
LnForecastError 98 -5.76478 1.177276 -8.24617 -6.630244 -5.66109 -5.130145 -1.95092 
 
Dispersion 101 -0.13819 0.129234 -0.85757 -0.1862933 -0.1019 -0.0567569 -0.00929 
 
LnDispersion 101 -2.32412 0.850328 -4.67834 -2.868979 -2.28378 -1.680433 -0.15365 
          Total Forecast Error 402 0.063559 0.240606 0 0.0021471 0.005678 0.0169051 2.261628 
 
LnForecastError 396 -4.90537 1.837157 -9.27089 -6.11281 -5.12845 -4.053662 0.816085 
 
Dispersion 384 -0.15177 0.30034 -3.31843 -0.1621826 -0.09448 -0.0497807 0.394069 
 






































           
Ln 
Dispersion 
-0.1 0.108* 1 
          
Ln 
Coverage 
-0.0688 -0.0874 -0.201*** 1 
         
Leverage -0.0788 0.104* 0.0258 -0.150** 1 
        
Ln Total 
Assets 
-0.017 -0.00821 -0.290*** 0.752*** -0.0527 1 
       
ROE 0.0211 -0.392*** -0.0811 0.0566 -0.0102 0.00906 1 
      
Institutional 
investors 
-0.0306 0.00622 -0.128* 0.469*** -0.281*** 0.343*** -0.0431 1 
     
CEO 
Duality 
-0.140** -0.130* -0.158** 0.248*** 0.107* 0.259*** 0.0587 0.0479 1 
    
Tier1Risk 
Ratio 
-0.0162 -0.0154 0.188*** -0.204*** -0.263*** -0.186*** -0.00938 0.0963 -0.0917 1 
   




-0.0304 0.469*** 0.122* -0.0765 0.120* 0.0248 -0.651*** -0.0466 -0.0387 0.034 -0.0881 1 
 
ACSize -0.0517 -0.0858 -0.00598 0.0967 -0.0747 0.156** -0.0549 0.0292 -0.0251 -0.00157 0.254*** -0.0215 1 





Table 25 Results of Regression of Financial Analysts' Forecast Error 
Independent variables LnForecastError 
  Coef. t 
Voluntary disclosure 
score -0.0656978*** -3.31 
LnCoverage -0.2264889 -1.44 
Leverage 0.0315925 0.92 
LnTotalAssets 0.1473835** 2.02 
ROE -1.408208** -2.35 
Institutional investors 0.4947197 1.07 
CEODuality -0.4715408*** -3.01 
Tier1RiskRatio -0.037843 -1.51 
BoardSize -0.065783** -2.36 
NegativeEarnings 1.768411*** 5.21 
ACSize -0.0692454 -1.03 
ACFE -0.1336083** -2.09 
Constant -6.483646*** -4.13 
Years-Control Yes   
Observations 396   











Table 26 Results of Regression of Financial Analysts' Forecast Dispersion 
Independent variables LnForecastDispersion 
  Coef. t 
Voluntary disclosure 
score -0.0270897** -2.23 
LnCoverage 0.0454581 0.44 
Leverage 0.0262969 1.22 
LnTotalAssets -0.1848128*** -3.98 
ROE -0.0115797 -0.03 
CEODuality -0.1709749* -1.77 
Tier1RiskRatio 0.0032987 0.22 
BoardSize -0.0276392 -1.63 
NegativeEarnings 0.6600796*** 3.02 
ACSize 0.0328915 0.8 
ACFE 0.0219715 0.56 
Constant 1.751243* 1.82 
Years-Control Yes   
Observations 384   
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